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March 1985 - May 1985
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Spending directives which attempt to control the
operations of regional centers are beyond the
Department of Developmental Services' authority under
the Lanterman Act: Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Deptartment of Developmental Services.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmen-
tal Services,' the supreme court held that the Department of Devel-
opmental Services (DDS) was without authority under the applicable
enabling statute to issue spending directives which would control
both the manner in which certain regional centers provided services
and their operations in general. The case arose when a number of or-
ganizations and individuals sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Department and its director, alleging that spending pri-
orities issued therefrom were void. The supreme court affirmed a
trial court ruling in favor of these particular organizations.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act 2 was en-
acted by the legislature to provide various facilities and services suffi-
1. 38 Cal. 3d 384, 696 P.2d 150, 211 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1985). The opinion was written
by Justice Mosk, which expressed the unanimous view of the court.
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 4500-4846 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
cient to meet the needs of the developmentally disabled3 at all stages
of life.4 The underlying policy of this comprehensive scheme is two-
fold: to minimize the institutionalization of these people and their
separation from family and community;5 and to allow them to live
more in harmony with the nondisabled of a similar age, leading to
more independent and productive lives.6
To implement this statutory scheme, the legislature created a sys-
tem in which DDS "[has] jurisdiction over the execution of the laws
relating to the care, custody, and treatment of developmentally dis-
abled persons."17 Private entities contract with DDS to provide the
disabled persons with "access to the facilities and services best suited
to them throughout their lifetime."'8 The private entities are solely
responsible for providing the necessary services, and the responsibil-
ity of the DDS is essentially limited to promoting uniformity and
cost-effectiveness of the entities' operations. 9 Further, the regional
centers implement the state's obligation to the developmentally dis-
abled under the Individual Program Plan (IPP) procedure.1 0
Forecasting a shortage of funds for the 1982-83 fiscal year, the di-
rector issued "Priorities for Regional Center Expenditures" (herein-
after "the Priorities") to insure an adequate appropriation for that
year. The Priorities disregarded all IPP's and designated a few cat-
agories as "basic and essential." These categories were to be provided
for only to the extent which funds were available.
When Plaintiff's filed this action to challenge the validity of the
Priorities, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction and ruled
that the Priorities were void. Although the Priorities were no longer
in effect at the time the case came before the supreme court,'1 the
3. "Developmental disability" is defined in the Code as:
A disability which originates before an individual attains age 18, continues, or
can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial handi-
cap for such individual.... This term shall include mental retardation, cere-
bral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. This term shall also include handicapping
conditions found to be closely related to mental retardation or to require
treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals, but shall
not include other handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature.
Id § 4512(a).
4. Id. § 4501.
5. Id. §§ 4501, 4509, 4685.
6. Id. §§ 4501, 4750-51.
7. Id. § 4416.
8. Id. § 4620. The private entities are referred to as "regional centers," and are
nonprofit community agencies.
9. For the Attorney General's opinion on this matter, see 64 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen.
910, 916 (1981); 62 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 229, 230-231 (1979).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4647 (West 1984). Each IPP includes an assess-
ment of the client's present status, objectives for improvement, a corresponding sched-
ule of necessary services, and a schedule of periodic review. Id. § 4646.
11. The directives were only in effect until June 30, 1983. Also, an emergency ap-
propriation under compulsion of the trial court's injunction superseded the directives.
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court decided the case was not moot.12  The supreme court held the
order granting preliminary injunction should be affirmed.13
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Scope of Judicial Review
The court recognized that the scope of judicial review of "quasi-leg-
islative administrative action" is established.14 "To be valid, such ad-
ministrative action must be within the scope of authority conferred
by the enabling statute.' 5 If, according to that statute, the adminis-
trative action has changed, enlarged, or narrowed its scope, the action
must be found void.16 To be upheld, the action must be authorized
through the acts of the legislature. Thus, if the court believes that
the administrative action transgresses the agency's statutory author-
ity there would be no need for further judicial review as there would
be no discretion to abuse.17
B. The Priorities Were Void
The court concluded that the Priorities were neither authorized by,
nor consistent with, the Lanterman Act.' 8 First, DDS had no author-
ity to control the manner in which the regional centers provided
services. Their district's sole responsibility concerned promoting the
cost-effectiveness of the center.19 Second, the state's obligation to
provide services, which would give the developmentally disabled
more independence, could not be impaired. Thus, so long as funds re-
main the DDS must provide full services to meet that obligation.20
The court also found the defendant's contention that the Priorities
were authorized by the Budget Act of 1982 to be untenable. The Di-
Association for Retarded Citizens, 38 Cal. 3d at 388 n.1, 696 P.2d at 151 n.1, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 759 n.1.
12. The court adressed the issue since it was "one of conceded public importance
and interest - has arisen in the past and is likely to arise in the future . Id.
13. Id. at 396, 696 P.2d at 156, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
14. Id. at 390-91, 696 P.2d at 153, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 392, 696 P.2d at 153, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citing CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§§ 11342.1, 11342.2 (West 1980)).
16. See Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 748, 433 P.2d 697, 707, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689,
699 (1967) (regulations held invalid as narrowing Welfare and Institution Code
§§ 14000-14026).
17. Association for Retarded Citizens, 38 Cal. 3d at 391, 696 P.2d at 153, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 761.
18. Id. at 391, 696 P.2d at 154, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 392, 696 P.2d at 154, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
rector of the DDS should only offer the regional centers "guidance in
determining how they may spend the funds appropriated to them in
the most cost-effective manner" rather than guidelines to which the
centers must adhere.21
Finally, the court analogized the instant case to the facts of Califor-
nia Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson.22 In that case, recipi-
ents of "Aid for Dependent Children" grants, and an association
alleging it acted on behalf of welfare recipients generally, sought to
enjoin the State Director of Social Welfare from implementing or en-
forcing certain regulations he had issued. There, the court "held that
the Social Welfare Director could not prevent a shortfall by in effect
altering the statute to give recipients anything less than the Legisla-
ture had granted. '2 3 Likewise, in the instant case, the Director could
not attempt to prevent any "shortfall by administratively altering the
[Lanterman] Act to give developmentally disabled persons anything
less than the Legislature provided. '24 Therefore, the issuance of the
preliminary injunction was affirmed.25
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's decision will limit the authority of the Department of
Developmental Services. Its holding will insure and protect the
rights of the disabled under the Lanterman Act, as the DDS's priori-
ties policy was an improper attempt at bureaucratic legislation.
DAVID A. VAN RIPER
II. ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE
Triable issue of legal malpractice is present when
attorney erroneously interprets a single case: Aloy v.
Mash
In Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 696 P.2d 656, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1985), the court considered whether a triable issue of an attorney's
negligence was presented when the attorney failed to assert a com-
munity property interest in a spouse's pension. The attorney based
his decision not to assert the client's interest in the pension on an in-
complete reading of one case.
21. Id.
22. 4 Cal. 3d 445, 482 P.2d 670, 93 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971).
23. Association for Retarded Citizens, 38 Cal. 3d at 395, 696 P.2d at 156, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 764.
24. Id.
25. Id. Since the court decided the Priorities were void pursuant to the Lanter-
man Act, there was no reason to determine their validity as per DDS's own regula-
tions, the California Constutution, or the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 395 n.5,
696 P.2d at 156 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 764 n.5.
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The defendant, an attorney, represented the plaintiff in a 1971 dis-
solution action against the plaintiff's husband. The husband had
been in the armed forces for twenty years. He was eligible to retire
and receive a pension although he was on active duty. During the
dissolution proceedings, the attorney failed to assert any community
property interest in the husband's pension. The plaintiff was pre-
vented from receiving any share of the pension.
During the malpractice action the defendant argued that his failure
to assert the wife's interest in the husband's pension was based upon
the reading of a single case, French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d
235 (1941). The defendant's contention that a non-matured military
pension was not subject to division upon dissolution was based solely
on his incomplete reading of French.
The court held that a triable issue of negligence was presented by
the plaintiff. It closely scrutinized the amount of research done by
the defendant. The court noted that in 1971, at the time the dissolu-
tion took place, California law regarding the characterization of
vested federal military retirement pensions as community or separate
property was unsettled. Furthermore, an attorney assumes an obliga-
tion to his client to undertake reasonable research, even in unsettled
areas of the law, in order to ascertain relevant legal principles. This
research enables the attorney to make informed decisions regarding
the conduct of a case.
In the present case, the defendant based his decision not to assert
his client's community property interest in the spouse's pension with
no more research or preparation than an incomplete reading of a sin-
gle case. The court held that the defendant acted without consider-
ing most of the major issues presented in the dissolution case. The
court reversed the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of
the defendant. It stated that a holding which immunized an attorney,
who had never researched the main issues of his client's case, from
legal malpractice would be contrary to past precedent. Therefore,
the court held that the trial court had erroneously determined that
there were no triable issues of fact presented by the plaintiff's legal
malpractice case. Accordingly the summary judgment order was
reversed.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
III. ATTORNEYS
In the absence of client ratification, an attorney lacks
authority to bind his client to arbitration without first
obtaining consent: Blanton v. Womancare Clinic, Inc.
In Blanton v. Womancare Clinic, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 696 P.2d 645,
212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985), the plaintiff's cause of action was based on
injuries received from a surgical abortion. The plaintiff sued the
clinic where the abortion was performed, the medical student who
performed the operation and the supervising physician for medical
malpractice. Two days before the trial, the plaintiff's attorney sub-
mitted the case to binding arbitration, without the consent of his cli-
ent. This stipulation to arbitrate was approved by the court, and an
order was issued. The plaintiff did not learn of the stipulation until
three months after the arbitration. She then dismissed her attorney
and retained new counsel who attempted to invalidate the
stipulation.
The issues presented to the court were whether the attorney had
the authority to bind the plaintiff to arbitration, and whether the
plaintiff had ratified the stipulation. The court answered both ques-
tions in the negative.
Justice Grodin, writing for the majority, held that the attorney's
authority to bind his client by stipulation was governed by agency
principles. Therefore the client was bound only by acts within the at-
torney's actual or apparent authority, or by unauthorized acts she
had ratified.
Under the apparent authority doctrine, an attorney is authorized to
bind the client in procedural matters that arise during the course of
litigation. Examples of this would be procedural stipulations inciden-
tal to the management of the suit. In addition, an attorney possesses
authority implied in law. This arises in tactical matters such as de-
ciding whether to call a particular witness. See 1 B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys, § 112 (2d ed. 1970). The court held
that an attorney may not impair the client's cause of action or sub-
stantial rights. See also Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760,
74 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969).
The attorney's decision making which effects substantial rights dif-
fers from procedural or tactical decision making. The attorney's deci-
sion-making on substantive matters affects the client's interest and
involves matters of judgment beyond technical competence. The stip-
ulation to arbitrate in this case was held to be one affecting the sub-
stantial rights of the client.
The court stated that an attorney does not have the implied au-
thority to enter into contracts on behalf of his client. See also Wilson
v. Eddy, 2 Cal. App. 3d 613, 82 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1969). The arbitration
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stipulation constituted a contract because it diverted the dispute from
the judicial arena into the arbitral one. The court noted that while it
may be the practice in the legal community to rely upon representa-
tions made by other attorneys, such representations cannot create au-
thority where none exists. It is therefore up to the person dealing
with the attorney to ascertain the extent of his authority.
Although unauthorized acts of the attorney may be ratified by the
client and become binding, the court determined that no such ratifi-
cation existed here. The plaintiff immediately fired her attorney
upon learning of the arbitration agreement and hired new counsel to
seek to invalidate it. Therefore, the attorney lacked the authority to
bind the plaintiff to arbitration, and no subsequent ratification
occurred.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
Iv. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS
A contractor may bring an action for compensation
where he has substantially complied with section 7031
of the Business and Professions Code, and a literal
application of Business and Professions Code section
7159 is inequitable where it allows unjust enrichment:
Asdourian v. Araj.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Asdourian v. Araj,1 the supreme court equitably applied sections
70312 and 71593 of the Business and Professions Code instead of ap-
plying them literally. The case arose from an action brought by a
contractor against a real estate investor to recover compensation for
services rendered under three remodeling contracts. The supreme
court, in ruling for the contractor, held that substantial compliance is
sufficient to meet contractors' licensing requirements.
1. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985). The opinion was written
by Chief Justice Bird, with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, Lucas, and Stephens concur-
ring. A separate concurring opinion was written by Justice Kaus, and a dissenting
opinion was authored by Justice Mosk.
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975), essentially denies unlicensed con-
tractors access to the courts to collect unpaid compensation and will be discussed in
more detail infra at notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7159 (West Supp. 1985), requires contracts for home
improvements in excess of $500 to be in writing, and is discussed in more detail infra
at notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1970, plaintiff Krikor Asdourian 4 applied for a contractor's li-
cense with the Contractor's State License Board, as required by Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 7028. The license was issued to
Artko Remodeling and Construction, the plaintiff's name and signa-
ture appearing thereupon as the "responsible managing party."
Although the plaintiff intended to incorporate under the Artko
name, the business remained a sole proprietorship. Asdourian even
did work under his own name on occasion, but never obtained a sepa-
rate license in his own name nor had the existing license changed.5
In 1976, Asdourian was introduced to defendant Ibrahim Araj by a
mutual acquaintance. 6 Shortly thereafter, the two parties entered
into three contracts for the purpose of remodeling properties owned
by the defendant in San Francisco. The contracts consisted of the fol-
lowing: (1) a written agreement to convert a garage on Lombard
Street into a restaurant; 7 (2) an oral agreement to remodel two flats
within the same building;8 and (3) an oral agreement to perform re-
pairs on a single family residence on San Fernando Way.9 When the
defendant refused to pay the plaintiff for a substantial portion of the
work done, Asdourian obtained a mechanic's lien on the Lombard
Street property. Actions filed by Asdourian to enforce the lien and
to recover the balance due on the remodeling of the San Fernando
Way property were consolidated into one action.10
At trial, the court found that the defendant had agreed to compen-
4. Asdourian was the plaintiff in this case. He came to the United States in 1970
from Lebanon, where he had worked as a contractor for the last twenty years. As-
dourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 279, 696 P.2d at 96, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
5. The plaintiff believed that, since he had taken the examination and received
the license, he was subject to no further requirements. Id, at 280, 696 P.2d at 97, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 705.
6. Araj, the defendant, was a grocer who bought and sold real estate for invest-
ment purposes. He could not read or write English. Id.
7. This agreement took place in or around late September of 1976. The contract
described the work to be done and established a price of $21,500. In order to meet Bu-
reau of Building Inspection specifications, the defendant agreed to a cost increase of
approximately $30,000. When the job had been substantially completed, the plaintiff
stopped working when the defendant refused to make any further payment. Id
8. The plaintiff had already remodeled two similar flats for the defendant in 1976
for a price of $11,000. Although no price was discussed concerning the next two, the
plaintiff performed the remodeling. Subsequently, he was not fully paid. Id at 280-81,
696 P.2d at 97, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
9. The parties entered into this contract in May of 1977. After the plaintiff began
repairs, the defendant made additional remodeling requests. It is unclear whether the
parties orally agreed upon a price. The plaintiff completed the remodeling in July of
1977. Thereafter, the defendant refused to pay the full amount of the reasonable value
of the plaintiff's services. Id. at 281, 696 P.2d at 97, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
10. In the defendant's answer, these allegations were denied, and a cross-com-
plaint was filed claiming the plaintiff had not completed the work and had been over-
paid. Id. at 281, 696 P.2d at 98, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
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sate the plaintiff for the reasonable value of his work performed on
all three contracts, and judgments were entered accordingly.1 1 The
defendant appealed, contending that: (1) the plaintiff could not re-
cover compensation for his work since he was not properly licensed
as required by section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code; and
(2) the oral agreements violated Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 7159, which requires all home improvement contracts involving
amounts in excess of $500 to be in writing.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Substantial Compliance With Section 7031
The court began its analysis by discussing the issue of substantial
compliance with section 7031. This section provides, in pertinent
part:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor,
may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection
of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which a license
is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly
licensed contractor at all times during the performance of such act or contract
-,12
This section enforces the Contractors License Law13 by denying a
contractor access to the courts when he has not complied with all li-
censing requirements. 14 In view of the harshness of a literal applica-
tion of section 7031, the courts have in certain instances been wary of
strictly enforcing it. As the supreme court stated in Latipac, Inc., v.
11. The reasonable value of the work performed on the Lombard Street property
was equated to $83,812.45. Of this amount, the defendant had paid only $45,223.47.
With regard to the San Fernando Way property, the reasonable value of the services
rendered was found to be $19,278.15. Of this amount, the defendant had paid only
$12,824.30. Based on these figures, separate judgments of $38,588.98 and $6,453.85 were
entered, respectively, on plaintiff's two claims. Id.
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975).
13. The Contractors License Law (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-7173 (West
1975 & Supp. 1985)) provides a comprehensive scheme governing contractors who do
business in California. Its general purpose is to protect the public from the inevitable
consequences of incompetent labor, imposition, and fraud. Although the court men-
tions Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 664, 48 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1966), in support of this proposition, the most often cited case is Howard v. State, 85
Cal. App. 2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948), where the court applied the act to an unlicensed
painter.
14. See Jackson v. Pancake, 266 Cal. App. 2d 307, 72 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1968), where
the court upheld a trial court's judgment allowing an unlicensed contractor to recover
the reasonable value of work performed, notwithstanding the harsh language of sec-
tion 7031.
Superior Court.15
In view of the severity of this sanction and of the forfeitures which it neces-
sarily entails, our decisions record our reluctance to construe (section 7031]
...more broadly than requisite to the achievement of its manifest purpose.
We have not insisted on literal compliance in the situation in which the party
seeking to escape his obligation has received the full protection which the
statute contemplates.
1 6
The court has instead employed the doctrine of "substantial compli-
ance" where equitable. 17
The court analogized this case to the earlier case of Gatti v. High-
land Park Builders, Inc.,i 8 where two individually licensed parties
performed work together as a partnership. Even though they did not
obtain a separate license for the partnership, the court found sub-
stantial compliance with section 7031 and did not strictly interpret
the statute. As the Gatti court stated, "[i]f defendant is allowed to
defeat plaintiffs' legitimate claim on this technical ground, resting on
an unnecessarily strict construction of the statutory provision . . .
the legislative scheme in relation to the licensing of contractors .. .
would become an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obli-
gation."'1 9 In analogizing the instant case to Gatti, the court found
the facts in the present case even more persuasive. "[H]ere, the form
of plaintiff's business did not change at all. It remained a sole propri-
etorship. Plaintiff simply used a different name for the business.
' 20
The court had most recently applied the "substantial compliance"
doctrine in Latipac. Although the plaintiff in Latipac possessed a
valid contractor's license upon execution of a contract, the license ex-
pired during the contract's execution. Since the plaintiff did not re-
new the license, the defendant sought to avoid compensating him on
the grounds that there had not been strict compliance with section
7031. In denying the defendant's appeal, the Latipac court said that
where "the facts clearly indicate that the contractor has 'substan-
tially' complied with the statute and that such compliance has af-
forded to the obligor the protection contemplated by the statute, we
15. 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966). For a detailed discussion
of this case, see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
16. 64 Cal. 2d at 279-80, 411 P.2d at 566, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
17. The three most common situations where the "substantial compliance" doc-
trine has been applied are: (1) where, following a change in the form of the contrac-
tor's business, there was a slight difference between the entity performing the contract
and the one named on the contract (see Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.
2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946)); (2) where the contractor's license expired before comple-
tion of a project (see Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49
Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966)); and (3) where the contractor's license was not obtained until
after execution of the contract (see Gaines v. Eastern Pacific, Santa Maria, 136 Cal.
App. 3d 679, 186 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1982)).
18. 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946).
19. Id. at 690, 166 P.2d at 266. In 1961, the legislature expressly incorporated the
Gatti exception into statute by amending section 7031.
20. 38 Cal. 3d at 284, 696 P.2d at 99, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 707 (emphasis in the original).
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have rejected the obligor's attempt to escape liability."21 The court
further set forth three factual requirements which would warrant ap-
plication of the substantial compliance doctrine: "(1) the fact that
plaintiff held a valid license at the time of contracting, (2) that plain-
tiff readily secured a renewal of that license and (3) that the respon-
sibility and competence of plaintiff's managing officer were officially
confirmed throughout the period of performance of the contract.122
In applying the Latipac test to the case before them, the majority
found the third requirement to be met, since the competence and ex-
perience of Asdourian formed the basis of the license issued to
Artko. Because the other two requirements were also met, As-
dourian therefore passed the Latipac "substantial compliance" test.2 3
The court also found the policy considerations of Schantz v. Ells-
worth24 to be indistinguishable. In Schantz, a regulation required
real estate brokers doing business under a fictitious name to be li-
censed under the fictitious name; its purpose was "to protect the pub-
lic from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or
untrustworthy real estate practitioners. '25 The court in Schantz ac-
knowledged that failure to meet this requirement may be grounds for
disciplinary action by the Real Estate Commissioner, but should not
bar a valid cause of action where plaintiff has satisfied the statutory
purpose by being licensed himself.26 In connection with the license
issued to Artko, Asdourian's individual qualifications were also ex-
amined and approved. The Asdourian court therefore held that:
Although he used a different name and should have obtained a separate li-
cense to comply with section 7028.5, his qualifications did not change, nor did
the status or form of his business. He was simply using a different name for
the same sole proprietorship.... As in Schant4 the plaintiff here has sub-
stantially complied with the licensing statute.
2 7
21. Latipac, 64 Cal. 2d at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
22. Id at 281-82, 411 P.2d at 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
23. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 286, 696 P.2d at 101, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 709. The main
focus of this test is whether the contractor's "substantial compliance with the licensing
requirements satisfies the policy of the statute." 64 Cal. 2d at 281, 411 P.2d at 567, 49
Cal. Rtpr. at 679 (quoting Lewis and Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 149, 308
P.2d 713, 718 (1957)).
24. 19 Cal. App. 3d 289, 96 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1971). In Schantz a personally licensed
real estate broker also did business under the fictitious name "Investment Trends."
Although he had not complied with a regulation requiring him to also obtain a license
under the fictitious name, presently codified at CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 2731
(1985), the court still allowed him to bring an action under a contract made and per-
formed under the fictitious name. Schantz, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 293, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
25. Schantz, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 293, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
26. Id
27. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 288-89, 696 P.2d at 103, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
Finally, the court disapproved the application of any decisions where
courts continued to insist on strict compliance with section 7031.2
B. Equitable Application of Section 7159
The court next considered the application of section 7159. The per-
tinent part of this section provides as follows:
This section shall apply only to home improvement contracts,. . . between a
contractor,. . . who contracts with an owner or tenant for work upon a build-
ing or structure ... and where the aggregate contract price . . . exceeds five
hundred dollars ($500). Every home improvement contract and any changes
in the contract subject to the provisions of this section shall be evidenced by a
writing and shall be signed by all the parties to the contract thereto.
2 9
Discussing the primary purpose behind the statute, an appellate court
stated that "the statute is intended as a protection for consumers in
an economic area which otherwise might well provide opportunity
for abuse by contractors. '30 The court found, however, that the pro-
tection offered by the statute extended even to experienced real es-
tate investors.31 Since section 7159 is considered a regulatory statute,
the court had to decide whether contracts not conforming to its re-
quirements are illegal and unenforceable as being against public
policy.
3 2
The general rule regarding contracts made in violation of a regula-
tory statute is that they are "void even though the statute does not
pronounce the fact."' 33 However, many exceptions to this general
rule have been recognized, for it "is not an inflexible one to be ap-
plied in its fullest rigor under any and all circumstances." 3 4 In
Southfield v. Barrett,3 5 the court created one such exception where it
enforced an illegal contract to prevent the defendant from becoming
28. ML at 286-88, 696 P.2d at 101-02, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10. The court stated, "[iut
has now been almost five decades since the [substantial compliance] doctrine was first
applied. The Legislature has manifested no disapproval. In the limited and extraordi-
nary circumstances in which it is applied, the policies underlying the doctrine remain
compelling". Id at 287-88, 696 P.2d at 102, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (emphasis in the
original).
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7159 (West Supp. 1985).
30. Calwood Structures, Inc. v. Herskovic, 105 Cal. App. 3d 519, 522, 164 Cal. Rptr.
463, 464-65 (1980). The Calwood court found a literal application of section 7159 to be
unjust where the contract was between social acquaintances who were in constant
communication concerning the work performed.
31. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 290, 696 P.2d at 104, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The court
added that "[c]ontractors should be encouraged to utilize written contracts for all
home improvement jobs, precisely to avoid the kind of dispute which arose here." Id.
at 290-91, 696 P.2d at 104, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
32. A violation of section 7159 is punishable as a misdemeanor. See CAL. BuS. &
PROF. CODE § 7159 (West Supp. 1985).
33. Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 3d 586, 591, 110 Cal. Rptr.
86, 90 (1973) (citing Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 57 P. 777 (1899), and Holm v.
Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 67 P.2d 114 (1937)).
34. Southfield v. Barrett, 13 Cal. App. 3d 290, 294, 91 Cal. Rptr. 514, 516 (1970).
35. 13 Cal. App. 3d 290, 91 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1970).
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unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.36 One of the main
justifications behind this exception was that "[t]he violation of law
was one which did not involve serious moral turpitude. ' '37
In applying this type of rationale to the instant case, the majority
felt a violation of section 7159 was also not the kind of illegality
which renders a contract void. The court stated, "[t]he contracts at
issue here were not malum in se. They were not immoral in charac-
ter, inherently inequitable or designed to further a crime or obstruct
justice . .. Rather, the contracts were malum prohibitum, and
hence only voidable depending on the factual context and the public
policies involved. ' 38 The court also considered the policy of the stat-
ute as it had changed over the years.3 9 Even though the penalties of
section 7159 were no longer exclusive, there was no indication that
legislative intent required all contracts made in violation thereof to
be void. The court added that "[i]t will not defeat the statutory policy
to allow plaintiff to recover for the reasonable value of the work per-
formed. '40 Finally, the court believed that the facts of the case, re-
gardless of any section 7159 violation, required the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff to avoid allowing the defendant to be un-
justly enriched.41
IV. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Kaus registered a concurring opinion merely to express his
doubt that the plaintiff was guilty of even a technical violation of sec-
tion 7028.5 of the Business and Professions Code,42 which prohibits
the managing officer of any licensed organization from engaging in
business as an individual. He believed that since the plaintiff was
36. In Southfleld, the court of appeals overturned a trial court finding that a con-
tract was illegal and void where the plaintiff was acting as a commission merchant
without a license, in violation of CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 1263 (West Supp. 1964), then in
effect.
37. Southfteld, 13 Cal. App. 3d at 294, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
38. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 293, 696 P.2d at 106, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
39. The original version of section 7159 expressly provided that contracts not in
compliance therewith were not immediately void. When the statute was amended in
1975, this language was deleted. Id. at 292, 696 P.2d at 105, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
40. Id. at 292, 696 P.2d at 106, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
41. Id. The defendant was a real estate investor and not an unsophisticated home-
owner or tenant. The parties were friends with a history of past dealings. Further-
more, the plaintiff fully performed according to the oral agreements. The court
analogized this case to Calwood Structures, Inc. v. Herskovic, 105 Cal App. 3d 519, 164
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1980).
42. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7028 (West 1975).
never an organization, but always an individual, he therefore could
not have violated this statute. Thus, Justice Kaus would have re-
solved the "substantial compliance" issue in an instant.4 3
Justice Mosk dissented, arguing that section 7031 deserved a literal
application. In his own words, "the majority employ[ed] equity in a
simple contract action and in doing so they emasculate[d] a legislative
enactment that is clear and unambiguous."'44 Justice Mosk believed
that the license issued to Artko was of no use to the plaintiff in main-
taining his cause of action as an individual. Thus, ignoring the re-
quirement that individuals must be personally licensed undermines
the purpose of the Contractors License Law. Finally, he found that
the only exception to this requirement existed where a partnership
failed to obtain a separate license, but each of the partners were indi-
vidually licensed. 45 The creation of any other exception is "a matter
for the legislature, not the courts. '46 Therefore, Justice Mosk agreed
with the court of appeal, which held that Asdourian should not have
been allowed to recover.47
V. CONCLUSION
The court's determination to move away from a literal application
of section 7031 is evidenced by its application of the substantial com-
pliance doctrine. Contractors may therefore have access to the courts
if they have substantially complied with licensing requirements.
Furthermore, the court liberally interpreted section 7159's writing
requirement to prevent defendants from becoming unjustly enriched.
The fact that section 7159's requirements were not met will not
render a contract void where unjust enrichment results.
DAVID A. VAN RIPER
43. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 295, 696 P.2d at 107, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (Kaus, J.,
concurring).
44. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
45. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 176, 102 Cal. Rptr.
541 (1972), where the plaintiff corporation was not licensed, but the individual worker
was. Although the court held that the plaintiff satisfied the three requirements of La-
tipac, it nevertheless held the doctrine of substantial compliance to be inapplicable.
46. Id at 185, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
47. Asdourian, 38 Cal. 3d at 295, 696 P.2d at 108, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk adopted as his own the relevant parts of the opinion of the
court of appeal. ML
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V. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The interests of substantial justice and the policy in
favor of trial on the merits provide for a liberal
application of section 473 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure: Elston v. City of Turlock.
In Elston v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal. 3d 227, 695 P.2d 713, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 416 (1985), the plaintiffs' attorney failed to respond to a request
for admission within the thirty days provided by section 2033 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2033
(West 1983). Receiving notice from one of the defendants that the al-
leged facts were deemed admitted, the plaintiffs' attorney moved to
set aside the admissions under section 473 of the same code. Id. § 473.
The attorney alleged that he first learned of the request for admis-
sions upon receipt of the defendant's notice since, due to an under-
staffed office, the original had been misplaced. The trial court denied
the plaintiffs' request for relief, whereupon all defendants made suc-
cessful motions for summary judgment.
The supreme court ruled that the trial court had not exercised its
discretion in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to
promote, rather than impede or impair, the ends of substantial jus-
tice. Since the law strongly favors trial on the merits, any doubts re-
garding section 473 must be resolved in favor of the moving party.
Carli v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 1095, 1099, 199 Cal. Rptr.
583, 585 (1984). The court then reviewed a number of cases in which
attorneys had failed to appear or answer because their employees had
either misplaced papers or misinformed them as to the proper date.
The case of Toon v. Pickwick Stages, Northern Division, Inc., 66
Cal. App. 450, 226 P. 628 (1924), was found to be analogous. In Toon,
even though the attorney could not identify the negligent employee
nor describe the office procedures followed, the fact that the attorney
had no personal knowledge of the service until after the default had
been entered was ruled excusable neglect. Therefore, absent preju-
dice to the opposing party, the court in Toon reversed the trial court's
denial of relief from default. Id. at 455-56, 226 P. at 630. Likewise,
absent allegations of prejudice by the defendants in Elston, the court
reversed the judgments in favor of the defendants and remanded the
cause to the trial court for further proceedings. But see Carroll v. Ab-
bot Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 892, 654 P.2d 775, 187 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1982) (construing section 473 of the Civil Code).
DAVID A. VAN RIPER
B. Former section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure held
not to require return receipt within three year limitation
period if summons and complaint are timely filed.
Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court.
Section 581a of the California Code of Civil Procedure requires an
action be dismissed "unless the summons on the complaint is served
and return made within three years after the commencement of said
action." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 581a (West 1976). (This provision
has since been repealed, but is substantively continued in CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 583.210, 583.250 (West Supp. 1985).) In Johnson &
Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 243, 695 P.2d 1058, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 517 (1985), the California Supreme Court was called upon to re-
solve the issue of whether a return receipt was required to be ob-
tained and filed within three years where the summons and
complaint were served by mail within the three year period. Chief
Justice Bird, writing for a unanimous court, held that the filing of
the return receipt was not required within three years in order to
satisfy the statute.
The case arose in DES litigation (cancer resulting from the drug di-
ethylstilbestrol) when several real parties in interest mailed sum-
monses and complaints to the defendant's corporate headquarters. In
each case this was done one day before the three year limitation pe-
riod had run. Later, the trial court permitted the real parties in in-
terest to amend their returns to include the return receipts, which
they had received after the three year time period. The court of ap-
peal consolidated the parties' petitions seeking writs to vacate the
lower court's order and granted the requested relief. The defendant
appealed to the supreme court.
The real parties employed the method of service provided under
section 415.40 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires sending
a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage pre-
paid, and obtaining a return receipt. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.40
(West Supp. 1985). The section declares that service is complete ten
days after mailing. The supreme court held that the parties met
these requirements and that the summonses were effective on the
date of mailing, even though the return receipts were received at a
later date.
The petitioner argued that the service was not effective until the
statutory requirements for proof of service had been met. The court
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dismissed this argument since the cases cited by the petitioner did
not address when service was effective under section 581a.
The petitioner also argued that service was only effective on the
date the summonses were actually received, citing section 415.30 of
the California Civil Procedure Code as support. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 415.30 (West 1973). The court distinguished section 415.30
from section 415.40, as section 415.40 contains no language requiring
receipt of the summons. Had the legislature intended service not to
be effective until receipt of a summons under section 415.40, it could
have stated this fact as it did in section 415.30.
Finally, the petitioner argued that service was not effective until
ten days after the summonses were mailed. However, after some
consideration, the court concluded that the ten days was a grace pe-
riod designed to give the defendant ample time before he was re-
quired to answer.
The supreme court next had to decide whether return was made
within three years of the commencement of the actions as required
under section 581a. The petitioner argued "return" as required under
sction 581a must include everything required for proof of service.
The real parties in interest said "return" and "proof of service" were
not the same thing. "Returned" had previously been defined two
ways: (1) "[fliled in the office of the county clerk with a statement of
the service within that time," Highlands Inn, Inc. v. Gurries, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 694, 697, 81 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 (1969), and (2) filing of the
summons "together with a statement of what was done in connection
with the service thereof." Frohman v. Bonelli, 91 Cal. App. 2d 285,
288, 204 P.2d 890, 892 (1949). In the court's opinion the returns filed
by the real parties satisfied these definitions.
The court reasoned that California Evidence Code section 641 es-
tablishes a presumption that a "letter correctly addressed and prop-
erly mailed is presumed to have been received." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 641 (West 1966). This presumption and the affidavits filed by the
parties were enough to satisfy section 581a, though not section 417.20,
requiring proof of service.
The court held that the trial court's ruling, which allowed the real
parties to amend their returns to include return receipts, was errone-
ous. However, the error did not effect the returns' sufficiency under
section 581a, and since that section's requirements of 581 were met,
service was effective when mailed.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
An individual is not susceptible to multiple charges for
one instance of driving under the influence, even where
several persons are injured: Wilkoff v. Superior Court.
Can an individual be charged with multiple counts of driving under
the influence when several people are injured? The court, in Wilk-
off v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 345, 696 P.2d 134, 211 Cal. Rptr. 742
(1985), answered this question in the negative. The court held that
one instance of driving under the influence, which causes injury to
one or several persons, results in only one count of driving under the
influence.
The defendant in this case had made an improper lane change that
caused a four-car collision which killed one individual and injured
five others. Shortly after the accident, a blood sample was taken
from the defendant revealing a blood alcohol level of .19 percent. See
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(b) (West Supp. 1985) (when blood-alcohol
level exceeds .10 percent, driving under influence is chargeable).
In reaching its holding, the supreme court relied upon section
23153 of the Vehicle Code. A driver violates section 23153 when he
operates a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, violates a
driving law and causes physical injury to another. Id. § 23153(a). In
analyzing this code section, the court affirmed the holding of People
v. Lobaugh, 18 Cal. App. 3d 75, 95 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971), which looked
to the actual act prohibited by the statute to determine the number
of times a violation of the statute should be charged.
The court reasoned that muliple counts can only be charged if the
actus reus is committed more than once. It emphazised that the ac-
tus reus of section 23153 is the act of driving a vehicle while intoxi-
cated and does not include the act of "causing" bodily injury while
driving intoxicated. This emphasis, however, seems inimical to the
language of the statute which requires an act that "proximately
causes . . . bodily injury." CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 (West Supp.
1985). Nonetheless, the court held only one count of driving under
the influence was chargeable. It added that where bodily injury
"proximately results" from the prohibited act, the offense is elevated
from a misdemeanor to a felony. Wilkoff, 38 Cal. 3d at 353, 696 P.2d
at 139, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 747. But see People v. Young, 224 Cal. App.
2d 420, 36 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1974) (multiple counts allowed).
To bolster its decision, the court pointed out that prior judicial in-
terpretation of section 23153 resulted in the same conclusion, and the
legislature had made no changes regarding this particular code sec-
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tion. This indicated the legislature had adopted that judicial
interpretation.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. California Penal Code section 1102.5, which allows a
prosecutor access to prior statements of defense
witnesses, held unconstitutional as violative of the
privilege against self-incrimination: In re Misener.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of In re Misener,I the court held section 1102.5 of the
California Penal Code unconstitutional. 2 The court based its conclu-
sion of unconstitutionality on the grounds that the statute violated
the self-incrimination privilege afforded all defendants under article
1, section 15 of the California Constitution,3 and that the prosecution
has the entire burden of proving a defendant is guilty.
Section 1102.5 allowed prosecutors to obtain from the defendant
prior statements made by a defense witness, other than the defend-
ant himself, after that witness has testified on direct examination. Its
effect is to aid the prosecution in impeaching the testimony of any
defense witnesses.4 The court found the defendant in Misener to be
incriminating himself by providing the prosecution with potential im-
peachment evidence. Therefore, the court held the statute to be in-
consistent with the self-incrimination protections provided criminal
1. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
2. Section 1102.5 provides, in pertinent part,
Upon motion, the prosecution shall be entitled to obtain from the defendant
or his or her counsel, all statements, oral or however preserved, by any de-
fense witness other than the defendant, after that witness has testified on di-
rect examination at trial. At the request of the defendant or his or her
counsel, the court shall review the statement in camera and limit discovery to
those matters within the scope of the direct testimony of the witness.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102.5(a) (West Supp. 1985). The term "in camera" is defined as a
hearing held "before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are ex-
cluded from the courtroom." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
3. The California Constitution provides that "[p]ersons may not ... be com-
pelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves .... CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 15.
4. If the witness' testimony under direct examination conflicts with his prior
statements, which were obtained by the prosecution through discovery pursuant to sec-
tion 1102.5, the witness' credibility would then be in question.
defendants by the California Constitution.5
II. FACTS
William Misener was an attorney acting as the public defender in a
robbery case. He was being held in contempt of court for not releas-
ing to the prosecuting attorney prior statements made by witnesses
called by the defense after the witnesses had testified on direct exam-
ination. Such "prosecutorial discovery" was required pursuant to sec-
tion 1102.5.
Prosecutorial discovery was first instituted in California with Jus-
tice Traynor's opinion 6 in Jones v. Superior Court.7 In Jones, the
court held that the prosecuting attorney in a rape case was entitled to
receive from defense counsel any reports and x-rays intended to be
brought into evidence by the defendant, as well as the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses intended to testify on defendant's behalf to prove
his affirmative defense of impotency. The court allowed this discov-
ery because the defendant would merely be disclosing information
that he would be revealing at trial anyway. This discovery was there-
fore held not to be self-incriminating.8
After the decision in Jones, it appeared that the California
Supreme Court was receptive to the idea of prosecutorial discovery.
However, in Prudhomme v. Superior Court,9 the supreme court lim-
ited such discovery to the specific facts of Jones. Even though the
United States Supreme Court has adopted a broader view of
prosecutorial discovery under the federal constitution, 10 the court has
retained its narrow view of prosecutorial discovery up to its recent
decision of in Misener.
The narrow test adopted in Prudhomme is whether the informa-
tion sought relates to a defense, or whether disclosure conceivably
lessens the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief.""1
5. Misener, 38 Cal. 3d at 546, 698 P.2d at 639, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
6. Justice Traynor was an advocate of prosecutorial discovery. See Louisell,
Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1965); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found In Criminal Discovery,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 243, 250 (1964).
7. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
8. Id. at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
9. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
10. In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the United States Supreme
Court espoused a broader view of prosecutorial discovery than California had in
Prudhomme. In Nobles, the Court required the defendant to turn over his investiga-
tors' written reports regarding interviews with the prosecution's eyewitnesses before
the defendant's investigators had even testified. The court concluded "that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the de-
fendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as wit-
nesses at trial." Id. at 234.
11. Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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Thus, California has retained a more stringent prosecutorial discov-
ery standard than the United States Supreme Court.1 2
More recently, the California Supreme Court continued its refusal
to expand prosecutorial discovery in People v. Collie.1 3 In Collie, the
court reiterated its unwillingness to expand prosecutorial discovery,
leaving the issue to the legislature. 1 4  The court even went so far as
to strongly hint that a prosecutorial discovery statute, if enacted by
the legislature, would not be valid.1 5
III. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
In analyzing the validity of section 1102.5, the court concluded that
the sole effect of the statute as written was to impeach the testimony
of defense witnesses. It has this effect because the statute allows dis-
covery of prior statements of defense witnesses pertaining to their di-
rect testimony. If these statements are conflicting, the witness'
credibility could thereby be impeached. 1 6  By supplying the prosecu-
tion with evidence that impeaches defense witnesses, the defendant is
aiding the prosecution.
In Prudhomme, the court held that the constitutionally recognized
self-incrimination privilege is violated when the matters to be dis-
closed "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving
12. In Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774
(1976), the California Supreme Court admitted that the federal standard was not
wholly consistent with the California standard of protection against self-incrimination.
"It is established that [the California] Constitution is a document of independent force
... whose construction is left to this court, informed but untrammeled by the United
States Supreme Court's reading of parallel federal provisions." Id. at 525, 557 P.2d at
67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776. The California Supreme Court "maintain[ed] that solicitude
and affirm the continued vitality of the stringent standards set forth in Prudhomme
for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as embodied in article I,
section 15 [of the California Constitution]." Id. See also supra note 3. For a complete
case analysis of Allen, see Note, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against
SeWlf-Incrimination, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 332 (1978).
13. 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981).
14. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discovery in California After People v. Collie:
The Need for Legislation, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 543 (1983).
15. The Collie court expressed foresight by stating: "[w]e have grave doubts that a
valid discovery rule affecting criminal defendants can be devised. But if the Legisla-
ture undertakes to formulate a comprehensive solution that purports to be practical in
application and consistent with the public interest any legislative error would be sub-
ject to judicial review. Ours is likely to be the last word on the subject; for that rea-
son, it should not also be the first." Collie, 30 Cal. 3d at 56, 634 P.2d at 541, 177 Cal.
Rptr. at 465 (footnote omitted).
16. Misener, 38 Cal. 3d at 554, 698 P.2d at 644, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
its case in chief."'17 The prosecution's burden is unquestionably light-
ened when he is handed evidence pursuant to section 1102.5; as a re-
sult, the prosecution is strengthening its own case with aid of the
defense counsel. The court concluded that "[t]here is no doubt that
the evisceration of a defense 'incriminates' the defendant."' 8
The court found the invalidity of section 1102.5 to be based solely
on its inconsistency with the self-incrimination privilege and the in-
terpretation of this privilege in Prudhomme. The majority concluded
by stating that "[t]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures from the
defendant that will aid the prosecution. To the extent they are use-
ful to the prosecution the disclosures required by section 1102.5 vio-
late the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Section
1102.5 is therefore unconstitutional.'
19
. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Lucas, believing that section 1102.5 was constitutional, filed
a dissenting opinion. In finding the criminal discovery statute valid,
Lucas relied upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Nobles,20 asserting that the statute would aid in
achieving the ultimate goal of the criminal justice system: the
"search for truth."21 Disagreeing with the majority's contention that
such discovery violated the self-incrimination privilege of the defend-
ant, Lucas asserted that the statements of third parties (defendant's
witnesses) would in no way compel self-incrimination; the third
party's statements are not personal to a defendant.
Lucas went on to accuse the majority of making prosecutorial dis-
covery unavailable in California, pointing out that this was a minor-
ity position.22 Precluding such valuable discovery, according to
Justice Lucas, "creat[es] a devastating 'roadblock' in the search for
the truth. '23 As a result, Lucas believes perjury will remain unno-
ticed in California criminal proceedings, whereas section 1102.5 could
help detect it.
IV. CONCLUSION
In holding 1102.5 unconstitutional, the court retained its very nar-
17. Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
18. Misener, 38 Cal. 2d at 556, 698 P.2d at 646, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
19. Id. at 558, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
20. 422 U.S. 225 (1975). See supra note 10.
21. Misener, 38 Cal. 3d at 559, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580. (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 562, 698 P.2d at 650, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Lucas brought to the court's
attention that a majority of the states as well as federal courts have recognized a right
of prosecutorial discovery.
23. Id
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row view of prosecutorial discovery adopted in Prudhomme. The
Prudhomme standard affords defendants a higher standard of protec-
tion under the self-incrimination privilege than does the federal stan-
dard. Thus, in California, the only incident where prosecutorial
discovery will be allowed is in cases analagous to Jones: where the
evidence attained through such discovery pertains merely to a partic-
ular affirmative defense asserted by the defendant that would not
lessen the prosecution's burden. This standard is so limited that
prosecutorial discovery in California appears to be a lost cause.
Missy K. BANKHEAD
B. Newly enacted driving under the influence statute to be
applied prospectively: Fox v. Alexis.
In Fox v. Alexis, 38 Cal. 3d 621, 699 P.2d 309, 214 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1985), the court held that a statute in effect when the offense of
driving under the influence of alcohol took place, controls actions
taken by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The court held that the
law which was in effect at the time of the offense controls, not the
law in effect at the time of conviction of the offense. The court based
its holding on the belief that the legislature had not intented to devi-
ate from the general rule that new statutes should be applied pro-
spectively as opposed to retroactively.
On February 25, 1982, after admitting to prior drunk driving con-
victions, the petitioner was found guilty of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs on December 19, 1981. At the time of the
arrest, section 13352.5 of the Vehicle Code prevented the revocation
of a drivers license when the court ordered the offender to partici-
pate in an approved alcohol rehabilitation program. On January 1,
1982, Sections 13352 and 13352.5 of the Vehicle Code went into effect
thereby superseding the prior statute. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13352,
13352.5 (West Supp. 1985). Pursuant to the new statute, the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles revoked the petitioner's license for a three
year period, even though the court ordered petitioner to participate
in an alcohol treatment program.
The court affirmed the trial court's order granting petition for a
writ of mandate directing the Department of Motor Vehicles to set
aside the revocation of the petitioner's license. The court stated that
the Department of Motor Vehicles had used petitioner's two prior of-
fenses as a basis for the revocation of petitioner's license, thereby ap-
plying the new statute retroactively. At the time of the arrest,
however, the petitioner's participation in an alcohol rehabilitation
program would have prohibited the D.M.V.'s revocation of his li-
cense. The court stated that this retroactive application was contrary
to the intent of the legislature and therefore, could not stand.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
C. Section 28 of article I of the California Constitution held
not to bar judicial discretion in the admission of prior
felony convictions: People v. Castro.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Castro,1 the court considered the question of whether a
witness' prior felony convictions are admissible into evidence in light
of article I, section 28(f), of the California Constitution.2 The case
arose when the defendant, Maria Castro, was convicted for receiving
stolen property. The trial court had allowed impeachment of the de-
fendant with prior convictions for the possession of heroin and pos-
session of heroin for sale.3 The defendant argued that section 28(f)
left Evidence Code section 352 intact, thereby excluding evidence of
convictions in certain cases. 4 The Attorney General claimed that sub-
division (f) eliminated judicial discretion in restricting the admission
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.5 In a plurality opin-
ion in which only three justices joined, the court affirmed the defend-
ant's convictions.6
1. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Kaus with Justices Mosk and Broussard concurring. There was
a separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Grodin. Justice Lucas filed a
separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Finally, there was a separate concurring
and dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Bird, with Justice Reynoso concurring.
2. Section 28, subdivision (f) provides:
Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal pro-
ceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it
shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f). For a more in-depth analysis of the effects of this case on
this constitutional provision, see Comment, Proposition 8: California Law After In Re
Lance W. And People v. Castro, 12 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1059 (1985).
3. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 305, 696 P.2d at 112-13, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
4. Id. at 305-06, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721. Section 352 reads: "The
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
5. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 306, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
6. Id. at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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II. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kaus, writing for the majority, held that section 28 was not
intended to eliminate the trial court's discretion in controlling the ad-
mission of prejudicial evidence. 7 Justice Kaus pointed out that sec-
tion 352 of the Evidence Code gives the trial judge discretion to
exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when its probative value
is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.8 However, this discre-
tion is not unlimited. In a line of cases beginning with People v. An-
tick 9 , the supreme court recognized that such discretion could be
abused.' 0 These cases involved instances where the lower courts ad-
mitted evidence the supreme court felt should have been excluded.
The court's refusal to admit the evidence in those cases was part of
the backdrop behind the framing of article I, section 28.11
Sections (d) and (f) of article I, section 28 are the focus of the Cas-
tro decision. The case involved a matter of statutory interpretation.
The court pointed out that subdivision (f) applies to all witnesses in
criminal cases. 12 Asking rhetorical questions, it stated that the fram-
ers could not have intended the trial court to have no discretion in
determining which prior convictions should be admitted.
13
The court then turned to the text of the constitutional amendment
to resolve the controversy. In interpreting a statute, the words them-
selves should be examined and given their ordinary meaning.14 The
court noted the clarity of subdivision (f) which is absolute in its lan-
guage as to the admission of prior felony convictions. Subdivision (d),
however, states that nothing in the section shall affect Evidence Code
sections 352, 782 or 1103.15 The word "section" was held to refer to
7. Id. at 306, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
8. Id. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
9. 15 Cal.2d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
10. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 307-08, 696 P.2d at 114-15, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 722. These
cases involved situations where the trial court had allowed a prior felony conviction of
one kind or another to come into evidence. The decisions to allow these convictions
into evidence were later held to constitute an abuse of the trial courts' discretion.
11. Id. at 308, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
12. Id. at 309, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
13. Id. For example, the court questioned whether the voters had intended that
"an elderly victim of a mugging [could not] avoid being impeached by a conviction for
conspiracy to disturb the peace (Penal Code §§ 182, 415) suffered in her youth?" Id.
14. Id. at 309-10, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723 (citing People v. Black, 32
Cal. 3d 1, 5, 648 P.2d 104, 105, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 454-55 (1982)).
15. Subdivision (d), entitled "Right to Truth-in Evidence" provides:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-third vote of the
all of section 28, not just to subdivision (d). This interpretation of
subdivision (d) defeated the Attorney General's argument that subdi-
vision (f) was not controlled by this language. 16
Gleaning nothing from the words themselves, the court examined
the ballot summary, that is, the arguments and analysis presented to
the electorate. 17 After an examination of the voter information, the
court concluded that neither the framers' nor the voters' intention as
to the trial court's discretion under section 352 was ascertainable.'"
Further, there were no legislative or administrative constructions of
the section to aid in interpreting the statute. 19 The court finally de-
cided that the initiative meant to preserve the trial court's discretion
as it is stated in the Evidence Code, but it meant to reject the "black
letter" rules of exclusion which were grafted into the code by the An-
tick line of decisions.20
The court then addressed the issue of what felonies should be ad-
missible to affect the credibility of a witness. That question was an-
swered with another question: "Can it be said with substantial
assurance that the credibility of a witness is adversely affected by his
having suffered this conviction?" 21 When the answer is no, impeach-
ment is prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 22 In determining what convictions would adversely af-
fect a witness' credibility, the court revived the standard enunciated
by Justice Holmes.23 The conviction must show a "general readiness
to do evil" which supports the proposition that the witness is of "bad
character" and unworthy of credit.24
The court concluded that only past felony convictions which in-
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (emphasis added).
16. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 310, 696 P.2d at 115-16, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24.
17. Id. (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 245-46, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rtpr. 239, 258 (1978) (ballot
summaries are helpful in determining the meaning of uncertain terms in an enactment
approved by the voters).
18. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 311, 696 P.2d at 116, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
19. Id. at 311, 696 P.2d at 116-17, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
20. Id. at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
21. Id at 313, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
22. Id. This is because "'[a]n important element of a fair trial is that only a jury
consider relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence.'"
Id. at 313-14, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968)).
23. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 314, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (citing Gertz v.
Fitchburg Railroad, 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884)).
24. Gertz, 134 Mass. at 78.
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volve "moral turpitude" satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such felonies need not involve
dishonesty, though felonies involving dishonesty more readily prove a
"bad character" and "general readiness to do evil."'25 The lower
courts must therefore determine whether or not a particular defend-
ant's prior felony conviction was one involving moral turpitude. In
making that determination the court decided that only the least adju-
dicated elements of the conviction could be looked at.26
In the present case the court decided that simple possession of her-
oin does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, though possession
for sale does.2 7 Thus, the defendant should not have been impeached
with the conviction for simple possession, and the trial court erred in
not exercising its discretion to exclude evidence of the conviction.
Nonetheless, because of the strength of the state's case, the court
found the error not to be prejudicial and upheld the conviction.28
B. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Grodin dissented from the plurality's interpretation of sub-
division (f).29 Grodin pointed out, as the plurality had, that the lan-
guage of subdivision (f) was as clear and concise as it could possibly
be.30 However, rather than relying on subdivision (d) to interpret (f),
Justice Grodin construed the two provisions against one another. He
concluded that subdivision (d) was a general provision, and that sub-
division (f) was a particular provision. Thus in accordance with statu-
tory rules of construction, the particular provision would govern the
general.3
1
Justice Grodin also pointed out that the incongruity between the
two subdivisions could be avoided by reading the word "section" in
subdivision (d) to mean "subdivision." This interpretation would
limit the effect on section 352 to subdivision (d), and the clarity of (f)
25. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 314-15, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
26. Id. at 317, 696 P.2d at 120, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing 3A J. WiGMORE, Evi-
DENCE §§ 879, 880 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970)).
27. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 317, 696 P.2d at 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
28. Id at 318-19, 696 P.2d at 121-22, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
29. Id. at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Grodin, J., concurring and
dissenting.)
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983)). Section 1859 states in
pertinent part: "When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter
is paramount to the former .... CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983).
would be unimpinged;3 2 the trial court's discretion would be
removed.
To further support his interpretation Grodin stated that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in People v. Beagle,33 had interpreted a con-
flict between Evidence Code section 788 and 352 to give the trial
courts "discretion to exclude proof of prior felony convictions offered
in impeachment. ' 34 He noted that the support for that case rested in
Luck v. United States.3 5 Following the Luck decision, Congress
amended the applicable statute to allow prior convictions into evi-
dence with certain exceptions. 36 A subsequent court of appeals deci-
sion held that Congress had overruled Luck and the trial courts'
discretion concerning the admissibility of prior convictions had been
eliminated.37 Justice Grodin argued that passage of article I, section
28 should be given a similar effect.
Justice Lucas concurred in the judgment affirming the conviction.
He agreed with Justice Grodin that subdivision (f) was intended to
completely eliminate any judicially created restrictions which would
bar the admission of prior felony convictions.38
Justice Lucas disagreed with Justice Grodin and with the majority
as to the "moral turpitude" exception to the admissibility of prior
convictions. 39 He argued the language "without limitation" of the
section should be construed literally. The proposed standard would
cause confusion and uncertainty, which could be avoided if all prior
convictions were admissible. 40
Chief Justice Bird concurred with the plurality decision in its de-
termination that the trial court has the discretion to exclude evi-
dence where its probative value is outweighed by the risk of undue
prejudice.41 The Chief Justice used relevance as the cornerstone of
her argument,42 that is, evidence must be relevant to be admissible.43
32. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 320, 696 P.2d at 123, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (Grodin, J., con-
curring and dissenting). See note 2 for text of section 352.
33. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rtpr. 313 (1972).
34. Id. at 452, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
35. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
36. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, PUB.
L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
37. Taylor v. United States, 280 A.2d 79 (D.C. 1971).
38. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 124-25, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33. (Lucas,
J., concurring and dissenting.)
39. Id. at 323, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
40. Id.
41. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
42. The Chief Justice's argument was adopted from a decision originally penned
by Judge Work in the appellate court decision of People v. Hoffman, later depublished
by the supreme court on February 14, 1985.
43. The Chief Justice relied on Evidence Code section 350 for this rule. It states,
"No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West
1966).
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The relevance of prior felony convictions has been controlled by sec-
tion 788,4 4 as construed by People v.Beagle 45 and its progeny.
Evidence of prior convictions to be relevant to impreaching a wit-
ness' credibility must address his truthfulness. The trial courts are to
determine whether the prior felony conviction demonstrates past un-
truthfulness or just creates an impression of bad character, which is
an improper basis for decision. It is "'only a conviction which has as
a necessary element an intent to deceive, defraud, lie, steal, etc.,
[that] impacts on the credibility of a witness.' "46 Thus, violent or as-
saultive crimes would have little or no bearing on one's credibility. 47
The Chief Justice's argument would not be persuasive unless rele-
vance were held to be compatible with and not excluded by the con-
stitutional amendment. Using the same rules of statutory
interpretation as the plurality,48 the Chief Justice construed subdivi-
sion (f) so as not to "preclude the assessment of relevance in deter-
mining prior conviction evidence for impeachment. '49
The People's argument that admission of prior felony convictions
for impeachment purposes is free from judicial restraint is defective
because it eliminates the second inferential step required for im-
peachment. The first step is the linking of the commission of the
44. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 states
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by
the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has
been convicted of a felony unless:
(a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness by the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted.
(b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the wit-
ness under the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of
Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code.
(c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under
the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this exception does not apply
to any criminal trial where the witness is being prosecuted for a subsequent
offense.
(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the wit-
ness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the convic-
tion pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to that referred to in
subdivision (b) or (c).
CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
45. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
46. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 325, 696 P.2d at 126, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (citing People v.
Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 123-24, 654 P.2d 1243, 1247, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720-21 (1982) (ci-
tations omitted)).
47. Id at 325, 696 P.2d at 127, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 734. See also People v. Beagle, 6
Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
48. See supra note 11.
49. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 327, 696 P.2d at 128, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 736 (Bird, C.J., con-
curring and dissenting).
prior felony to a propensity in the witness to lie. The second step is
the fact-finder's inference that the witness is dishonest or
untruthful.50
Looking at the legislative analysis of subdivision (f) and the lan-
guage of the constitutional amendment, the Chief Justice found rele-
vance to be a prerequisite for admitting prior felony convictions for
impeachment. 51 Such an interpretation of the amendment would
avoid due process problems. Due process requires a fundamentally
fair trial, of which the control of evidence is a part.52 While Califor-
nia courts have previously found no due process infringements in the
impeachment of an accused with his prior felony convictions, the dic-
tum and the dissenting opinion in Spencer v. Texas 53 indicates that
removal of relevance as a standard might violate due process.54
The Chief Justice dissented from the plurality's adoption of "moral
turpitude" as the standard for admissibility of evidence of prior fel-
ony convictions used to impeach.55 Such a standard has been subject
to various judicial interpretations which one commentator has said
are "so imprecise that it is only a matter of conjecture whether a par-
ticular crime involves it."56 In addition to lacking a definition, the
"moral turpitude" standard opens the way for judges to apply their
own personal views as to what this phrase encompasses, again leading
to inconsistent results. Finally, the Chief Justice noted that a vast
number of noncriminal decisions have used the moral turpitude lan-
guage with varying and inconsistent results. This only adds to the
confusion courts face as they attempt to apply the standard in crimi-
nal cases. 57
III. CONCLUSION
The statutory principle of construction which requires that words
be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning was applied
by the plurality, and the Chief Justice in her concurring and dissent-
ing opinion, to interpret article I, section 28. Each application re-
sulted in a different interpretation, illustrating the confusion that
50. Id.
51. Id. at 329-30, 696 P.2d at 129-30, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38.
52. Id. at 331, 696 P.2d at 131, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199 (1960); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)).
53. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
54. Id. at 570-71 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren stated,
"[E]vidence of prior crimes introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal dis-
position would violate the Due Process Clause." Id. at 574.
55. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 332-33, 696 P.2d at 132, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
56. Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. REV. 533, 542 (1962).
57. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 334-36, 696 P.2d at 133-34, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42 (Bird,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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will likely result from the court's decision. Various prior felonies
may be viewed as involving moral turpitude by one court and not by
another. Inconsistent applications will abound, creating judicial
chaos. One can only hope Justice Grodin's sound advice will be
heeded and the legislature will quickly act to expressly set forth the
felonies that, in its opinion, involve moral turpitude.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
D. The Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend a license
of a twice convicted drunk driving offender under
Vehicle Code section 13352 without alleging or proving
the prior conviction in a second criminal proceeding:
Pollack v. Deptartment of Motor Vehicles.
In Pollack v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 38 Cal. 3d 367, 696
P.2d 141, 211 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985), the court was called upon to inter-
pret the ambiguous wording of Vehicle Code section 13352, as
amended in 1981. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Supp. 1985). The
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the defendant's
driver's license for one year under section 13352(a)(3) after he had
been convicted of drunk driving for the second time in five years.
The superior court vacated the order because the prosecutor did not
plead and prove the prior conviction in the defendant's second hear-
ing. The supreme court reversed the judgment, finding that the leg-
islature did not intend to impose a "plead and prove" requirement on
the administrative process for suspending a license when it amended
section 13352.
The supreme court relied on the well-established principle of statu-
tory interpretation, which calls for "'the ascertainment of legislative
intent so that the purpose of the law may be effectuated. . . .' " Pol-
lack, 38 Cal. 3d at 372, 696 P.2d at 143, 211 Cal. Rptr at 751 (quoting
People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 40, 544 P.2d
1322, 1328, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1976)). In determining the objec-
tive of the legislature, the court looked to the intent and meaning ex-
pressed in the Legislative Counsel's Digest. As to the 1981
amendment, the digest stated, "[t]he bill would require the depart-
ment to suspend the privilege [to operate a motor vehicle] for 1 year
for a second conviction of [driving while under the influence of intox-
icating liquor or drugs or the combined influence thereof] . .. ."
Pollack, 38 Cal. 3d at 376, 696 P.2d at 146, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 753 (quot-
ing Legis. Counsel's Dig. of Assembly Bill. No. 541 (1981 Reg. Sess.)).
The court held that the language of the digest clearly expressed the
intent of the legislature not to require the pleading and proof of the
prior conviction.
As further justification for its finding, the court stated the legisla-
ture had provided that the law would also apply to out-of-state con-
victions even if the DMV had no way to ascertain whether the prior
convictions had been alleged and proven in the out-of-state proceed-
ings. The court reasoned it was unlikely that the legislature would
provide special procedural protections for California proceedings and
not provide similar protections for out-of-state proceedings if it in-
tended to impose the requirement on the DMV.
Finally, the court determined that its holding would not be con-
trary to the due process clause under the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution or article I, sections 7 and 15 of the
California Constitution.
DAVID A. VAN RIPER
VIII. GOVERNMENT
Government Code section 1090, which prohibits city
officials from having any financial interest in contracts
entered into in their official capacity, held to require
harsh remedy for violation: Thomson v. Call.
Thomson v. Call, 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139
(1985), arose out of a complex local transaction. IGC Corporation
owned land in the city of Albany, which it sought to have rezoned.
The Albany City Council agreed to the rezoning and the issuance of a
conditional use permit only if the IGC would acquire parkland for
the city. Part of the land ICG was to acquire was owned by an Al-
bany City Council member, but that fact was not revealed to the
other council members. The corporation purchased the land for
$258,000 and then turned it over to the city. The interested council-
man, on several occasions prior to closing the deal, had sought and
obtained advice from the city attorney as to the propriety of the
transactions.
The trial court found the councilman had not committed fraud, nor
had he conspired with the other council members to violate section
1090, which prohibits city officials from having a financial interest in
contracts entered into in their official capacity. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 1090 (West 1980). Nonetheless, the trial court did decide that the
councilman had violated the statute. The court required him to re-
turn the purchase price of the land plus interest. Additionally, the
city was to retain title to the land. The court denied the Plaintiff's
claim that the corporate defendants had breached the contract be-
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cause they failed to transfer the parkland to the city. The plaintiff
and defendants appealed.
The supreme court found that the purchase of the property from
the councilman and its subsequent conveyance to the city constituted
a single contract. The court noted that the goals of section 1090 sup-
port the rule that public officers cannot make contracts in their offi-
cial capacity, nor become interested in such contracts. See also City
of Oakland v. California Construction Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 104 P.2d 30
(1940) (conflict of interest must occur at time contract is awarded).
The court further decided that section 1090 was violated despite the
absence of fraud or the presence of a good faith mistake.
The court then focused on the appropriate remedy for the situation
in which a fully executed and performed contract has been found to
violate Section 1090. The court noted that the city was entitled under
case law to recover the consideration it had paid without restoring
the benefits received. Since the contract violated public policy, there
was no ground for any equitable consideration on the defendants' be-
half (such as quantum meruit recovery).
Justice Kaus, writing for the majority, recognized that the remedy
was a harsh one, but he noted that it was necessary to eliminate any
temptation of future impropriety. The remedy also provided a strong
incentive to public officials to avoid conflicts of interest. Considera-
tions of fairness or of the advantage of the contract to the city would
weaken the remedy's deterrent effect. The court illustrated this by
suggesting an intermediate approach and then proceeded to show
how it would compromise the statute. Due to the significant public
policy goals mandating strict enforcement of the conflict of interest
statute, the court affirmed the rather harsh remedy.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
IX. INDIAN LAW
State regulation of outdoor advertising on Indian
reservations preempted by federal law: People ex rel.
Department of Transportation v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising
Co. of California.
In People ex rel. v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. of California,
38 Cal. 3d 509, 698 P.2d 150, 213 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1985), the California
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether billboards on
Indian reservations were subject to state regulation.
Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. (Naegele) was actively involved
in the business of operating billboards on leased land located next to
highways. Naegele became interested in leasing land at the Morango
Indian Reservation (Reservation), which was land held in trust by
the United States, for the purpose of operating billboards on that
land. A lease agreement was obtained by Naegele shortly thereafter.
However, approval of the lease was denied by the United States De-
partment of the Interior (Interior). The beneficial owners of the res-
ervation appealed the decision to the Board of Indian Affairs, and the
decision was reversed. The Interior appealed, but during the pen-
dency of the appeal, the beneficial owners of the reservation entered
into an agency agreement with Naegele for the operation of bill-
boards on the Reservation. The Deparment of Transporation of the
State of California notified Naegele that the state had the power to
enforce state regulations dealing with the operation of the billboards.
Hence, the issue that arose was whether billboards on the Indian res-
ervation were subject to regulation by the State of California.
The Court set the proper foundation for discussion on the case by
explaining that both the United States and California have statutes
which regulate outdoor advertising. The federal act, entitled the
Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 135, 136, 319
(1982), forbids outdoor advertising displays within 660 feet of any fed-
eral primary system highway or interstate. Any state failing to com-
ply with the Highway Beautification Act may lose ten percent of its
highway funds. The act contemplates state compliance through the
use of the state's inherent powers of zoning and condemnation. Cali-
fornia has enacted regulations seeking to comply with the federal act.
The Outdoor Advertising Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5231
(West Supp. 1985) places restrictions similar to those of the federal
act upon outdoor advertising.
The court held that Congress had not authorized state regulation
of outdoor advertising on Indian reservations. It also decided that
even if the federal act was intended to apply to Indian reservations,
Congress did not necessarily intend for the states to enforce the act.
The court noted that the Highway Beautification Act reserved the
enforcement procedure of the Act to the federal government. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that two state enforcement mechanisms rec-
ognized as zoning and eminent domain cannot be used by the states
where Indian reservations are involved.
The court rejected the argument that state laws are effective in In-
dian reservations under Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
589 (1953). This law only gives states jurisdiction over private civil
litigation involving Indian reservations in state court. Public Law 280
was not meant to cover general civil/regulatory laws on Indian reser-
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vations. See generally Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (re-
garding the legislative intent of Public Law 280).
While in some cases a state may assert authority over activities on
an Indian reservation, the court did not feel this was such a case.
Since the California state law would conflict with the purposes of the
federal legislation by subjecting the reservations to state regulation
where they would otherwise be exempt from control under the fed-
eral act, or by "imposing inconsistent state regulations in an area re-
served for federal oversight," Naegele, 38 Cal. 3d at 522, 698 P.2d at
158, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 255, it was held to be preempted by the federal
law.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
X. INSURANCE LAW
Burden of proving suicidal intent is on Insurer when
Life Insurance benefits have been denied under suicide
exculpatory clause: Searle v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
Life insurance policies commonly contain clauses which exclude
coverage for suicide during a certain time period. In Searle v. Allstate
Life Insurance Co.,I the California Supreme Court struggled to de-
cide the meaning and effect of such a clause. In an opinion authored
by Justice Reynoso the court held that the clause as it was worded
was unambiguous, and that the burden of proving suicidal intent
rested on the insurer.2
Petitioner's decedent purchased a $50,000 life insurance policy from
Allstate in May of 1975. The policy contained a clause which ex-
cluded coverage for "suicide, whether sane or insane," within two
years of the issuance of the policy. The decedent had fully paid his
premiums at the time of his death on March 13, 1976. The decedent's
death was caused by a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Al-
ice Searle, the decedent's wife, filed a claim for payment on the pol-
l. 38 Cal. 3d 425, 696 P.2d 1308, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1985). Justice Reynoso deliv-
ered the majority opinion with Justices Kaus, Broussard, Grodin and Ackerman join-
ing. Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice
Mosk dissented. Justice Ackerman was sitting under assignment by the chairperson of
the Judicial Council.
2. Id at 435, 696 P.2d at 1313, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
icy but was denied the benefits. She then filed this action.3
Allstate moved for summary judgment which the trial court
granted.4 The court of appeal reversed that decision and remanded
the case for trial. At trial the court instructed the jury that Searle
had the burden of proof as to the decedent's intent to take his own
life. Under that instruction the jury returned special findings on
which the court entered judgment for the defendant.5
II. MAJORITY OPINION
A. "Law of the Case"
The supreme court began its discussion by justifying its review of
the case. It recognized that multiple appellate review of the same is-
sue in a single case is generally precluded by the "law-of-the-case"
doctrine, even in instances where the prior appeal was heard in the
court of appeal.6 The court noted, however, that the doctrine is not
inflexible;7 when the lower court's decision is manifestly unjust, the
issue may be heard again on appeal.8 An unjust decision does not in-
clude mere disagreement with the prior appellate court's ruling, but
requires a "manifest misapplication of existing principles."9
The court further noted that the primary purpose behind the rule
is judicial economy.10 Where a court decides that the decision should
be reversed on a different ground than was used in the prior appeal,
the reasoning behind the rule is not served.'1 In this case the prior
court of appeal did not make a determinative ruling on the issue of
the burden of proof; it only decided whether there existed any issue
of material facts in the summary judgment. The supreme court's re-
view of the case was therefore proper. 12
B. Meaning of "Suicide, Whether Sane or Insane"
The court of appeal held that the clause excluding coverage for sui-
3. Id. at 430, 696 P.2d at 1310, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
4. The motion was granted because the undisputed evidence showed the death
occurred ten months after the issuance of the policy.
5. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 430, 434, 696 P.2d at 1311, 1313, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 469, 471.
6. Id. at 434, 696 P.2d at 1313, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (citing United Dredging Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 208 Cal. 705, 284 P. 922 (1930)).
7. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 434, 696 P.2d at 1314, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (quoting Davies
v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535 P.2d 1161, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975)).
8. See England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P.2d 813 (1939)
(even a third appeal to the California Supreme Court was accepted).
9. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 435, 696 P.2d at 1314, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (quoting People
v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 846, 533 P.2d 211, 219, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 91 (1975)).
10. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 435, 696 P.2d at 1314, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
11. Id. See State v. Zimmerman, 175 Mont. 179, 573 P.2d 174 (1977); State v. Hale,
129 Mont. 449, 291 P.2d 229 (1955).
12. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 435, 696 P.2d at 1314, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
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cide, whether sane or insane, was ambiguous because insanity pre-
cluded forming the intent to commit suicide. The supreme court
disagreed.13 It stated that the phrase has been used in accident and
life insurance policies for nearly one hundred years.14 Interpreting a
similar clause, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[n]othing
can be clearer than that the words, 'sane or insane,' were introduced
for the purpose of excepting from the operation of the policy any in-
tended self-destruction. '1 5
In other jurisdictions, courts addressing the meaning of similar
phrases have also held them to include any intentional self-destruc-
tion.16 Thus, the California Supreme Court concluded that the clause
would exempt the insurer from liability regardless of the victim's
sanity, if the act of self-destruction was committed with suicidal in-
tent. 1 7 Nonetheless, such intent could be negated by showing that
the insured did not understand the physical nature and consequences
of his act.1 8
C. The Burden of Proof for Suicidal Intent
As to the burden of proof, the trial court instructed the jury that
the plaintiff had the burden of proving her husband did not intend to
commit suicide. The supreme court, however, held that the instruc-
tion was erroneous. The burden of proving suicidal intent should
properly be placed on the insurance company before it may deny cov-
erage. 19 Traditionally, the insurance company has always had the
"burden of bringing itself within any exculpatory clause contained in
the policy .... -20 Though the claimant must show a loss from a
peril covered by the life insurance policy, he "need not aver the per-
formance of conditions subsequent, nor negative prohibited acts, nor
13. Id. at 436-37, 696 P.2d at 1315, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
14. Id. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876)(upheld a
similar clause after giving it a "reasonable construction").
15. Bigelow, 93 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
16. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 436, 696 P.2d at 1315, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 473. See, e.g., John-
son v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 404 F.2d 1202 (3d Cir. 1968); Strasberg v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 281 A.D. 9, 117 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1952).
17. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 437, 696 P.2d at 1315, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court equated suicidal intent with the purposeful or intentional caus-
ing of death.
20. Id. at 438, 696 P.2d at 1316, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (quoting Executive Aviation
Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 806, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351
(1971)). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966).
deny that the loss occurred from the excepted risks."2 1 A claimant
therefore only has to prove self-destruction by the insured to shift
the burden of proof. The insurer must then prove suicidal intent to
exclude coverage.
Allstate contended that self-destruction and suicide were synony-
mous.22 However, the case it offered in support of that contention
merely mentioned the argument in the form of dicta.2 3 Additionally,
the dictionary definition of suicide that Allstate offered was an ab-
breviated one;2 4 the full definition supported the court's view.
Since Allstate had the burden of proving suicidal intent, the lower
court's decision would be reversed if the erroneous instruction was
likely to have misled the jury.25 The court held that the instruction
imposed an improper burden on the plaintiff and constituted revers-
ible error.
D. Relevance of Evidence of Mental Capacity and Irresistible
Impulse
The supreme court's definition of suicidal intent requires the cause
of death to be purposeful or intentional.26 The court stated that if a
person did not understand the physical nature and consequences of
his act at the time, whether he was sane or insane, he could not be
considered to have intentionally killed himself. Therefore, evidence
of mental capacity is relevant and admissible to negate a showing of
suicidal intent.27
Allstate argued, however, that the clause "sane or insane" negated
the issue of the insured's state of mind. 28 The court recognized the
split of authority as to that assertion, and even though Allstate's posi-
tion represented the majority of jurisdictions,29 the court rejected the
argument.30 It found the minority view persuasive: where an insured
"is so utterly insane that he does not realize what he is doing, or that
the act will cause death, then a recovery may be allowed. '31 Under
21. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 438, 696 P.2d at 1316, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (quoting Dennis
v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570, 572, 24 P. 120, 121 (1890)).
22. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 438, 696 P.2d at 1316, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
23. Dennis, 84 Cal. at 571-72, 24 P. at 120-21.
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1602 (4th ed. 1968) defines suicide as "[s]elf destruc-
tion; the deliberate termination of one's existence, while in possession and enjoyment
of his mental faculties."
25. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 439, 696 P.2d at 1317, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (citing Hender-
son v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974)).
26. See supra note 19.
27. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 439, 696 P.2d at 1317, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 440, 696 P.2d at 1317, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
30. See IB J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 493 pp. 348-55 (rev. ed.
1981).
31. Id. at 351.
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this rule inquiry into the deceased's ability to understand the nature
and consequences of his acts is relevant and permissible at trial.
3 2
The court also held that a showing of suicidal intent could not be ne-
gated by proof of a killing under an irresistible impulse.
33
III. SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of 0tief Justice Bird
The Chief Justice concurred in the majority's decision as to the
burden of proof,34 but she disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the language of the suicide exemption.35 She stated that insur-
ance contracts are contracts of adhesion. Where an ambiguity exists
in one of those contracts it must be read against the insurer.3 6 Using
common dictionary definitions, 37 the Chief Justice concluded that the
phrase "suicide, whether sane or insane" was ambiguous. As the
terms were defined, one could not commit suicide and be insane at
the same time since insanity precluded the necessary intent in sui-
cide. She resolved the ambiguity by construing the phrase against
the insurer, making it ineffective.
38
The Chief Justice then noted that in contracts that do not have
that language, the majority of jurisdictions hold the insurer liable
"unless the insured was able to comprehend not only the physical na-
ture and consequences of his act, but also its moral character and
general nature. ' 3 9 The Chief Justice would adopt this approach, with
a modification that the beneficiary have the opportunity to prove the
insured was incapable of understanding the moral character and gen-
eral nature of his act.
4 0
32. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 440, 696 P.2d at 1317-18, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
33. Id. at 440-41, 696 P.2d at 1318, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
34. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 441-42, 696 P.2d at 1319, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 477. See Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rtpr. 711 (1974); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1644 (West 1984).
37. Suicide is defined as "the act or an instance of taking one's own life voluntarily
and intentionally, . . . the deliberate and intentional destruction of his own life by a
person of years of discretion and of sound mind .. " WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 2286 (1961) (emphasis added). Insane is defined as "exhibiting
unsoundness or disorder of mind." Id. at 1167.
38. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 444, 696 P.2d at 1320, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 478. (Bird, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
39. Id. at 444-45, 696 P.2d at 1321, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 479 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
B. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mosk
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the phrase "suicide,
whether sane or insane" was not ambiguous. 41 He relied on the fact,
as the majority did, that for over one hundred years the courts had
been interpreting and enforcing contracts containing such clauses.42
Additionally, he pointed out that the statutes of several states per-
mitted the use of that very phrase.43
Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority ruling that the insurer
could only be exempt from liability by proving the decedent had com-
mitted the act with suicidal intent. The better standard, he sug-
gested, would be one that looked to whether the act was intentional
or unintentional. The plain meaning of the clause in Justice Mosk's
opinion is that all nonaccidental self- destructions are outside of the
coverage of the policy.
The Justice states that his interpretation would promote the goals
of broad coverage and low premiums.44 Coverage would be increased
since the insurer agrees to "regard suicide after that length of time as
one of the hazards covered by the policy."'45 Premiums are reduced
because (1) the clause would exempt payment of benefits for suicide
within a two year period;46 (2) the clause would avoid the costs of
proving fraud when the suicide is designed to provide money for a
family;47 and (3) it would avoid derivative costs otherwise imposed on
insurers, such as the legal costs and fees required to determine the
decedent's state of mind under the majority's holding.48
Justice Mosk also pointed out that the great majority of courts that
have interpreted the clause agree that it excludes coverage of all in-
tentional suicides.49 The rule adopted by the court in this case is the
minority view5° and is incorrect in Mosk's eyes.51 The court's inter-
pretation of the phrase is not in accord with popular understanding,52
41. Id.
42. Id. at 447, 696 P.2d at 1322, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
43. Id. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
44. Id. at 447, 696 P.2d at 1323, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
45. Id.' (quoting Longerberger v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 121 Pa. Super.
225, 183 A. 422 (1936).
46. Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 448, 696 P.2d at 1323, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 481 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 449-50, 696 P.2d at 1324, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
50. Id. at 450-51, 696 P.2d at 1325, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
51. Id. at 450, 696 P.2d at 1325, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
52. Id.
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and is antithetical to the purpose of the clause.
5 3
IV. CONCLUSION
This decision places a new burden of proof on insurance companies
denying life insurance benefits under policies that exclude coverage
of suicide, "whether sane or insane." Claimants no longer need to
prove the insured's death from self-inflicted injuries was not a sui-
cide. Insurance companies, in order to successfully deny payment,
must now prove that the insured's self-destruction was intentional
and that he understood the nature and consequences of his act. Un-
doubtedly, this decision will prompt insurance companies to redraft
the suicide exclusions of their policies as they attempt to shrug off
this rather substantial burden, and it may even cause a rise in pre-
mium payments.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
xI. LABOR LAW
Where a work stoppage does not pose an imminent
threat to public health or safety, public employees can
engage in a concerted work stoppage for the purposes of
improving wages or conditions of employment: County
Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Association, Local 660.
I. INTRODUCTION
In County Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Em-
ployee's Association Local 660,1 the California Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether the common law prohibition
against public sector strikes should still be recognized. In a landmark
decision, the court held that it is not unlawful for public employees
to engage in a concerted work stoppage done for the purpose of im-
proving the employees' wages or conditions of employment.2 The
53. Id. The purpose of the clause is to make the insured's state of mind immate-
rial and thereby avoid unnecessary and costly litigation.
1. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985). The opinion was written
by Justice Broussard, with Justices Mosk and Grodin concurring. A separate concur-
ring opinion was written by Justice Kaus with Justice Reynoso concurring. There
were also separate concurring opinions by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Grodin. Fi-
nally, there was a separate dissenting opinion by Justice Lucas.
2. Id, at 592, 699 P.2d at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
court limited its holding in that public sector strikes will still be sub-
ject to the common law prohibition where it has been determined
that concerted work stoppage poses an imminent threat to public
health or safety.3
On July 5, 1976, after negotiations between the plaintiff4 and the
defendant union5 failed to produce an acceptable wage and benefit
agreement, seventy-five percent of the employees went on strike.6
The County Sanitation District, upon filing a complaint for injunctive
relief and damages, was granted a temporary restraining order.7
Eleven days after the strike began, the employees accepted a tenta-
tive agreement which contained terms identical to those initially of-
fered by the district.8 The trial court found the strike to be unlawful
and in violation of the public policy of California.9
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before the turn of the century, a majority of jurisdictions in the
United States held that no employee had a right to strike in concert
with any other fellow employee. 10 This common law prohibition ap-
plied to both public and private employees. 1 While this prohibition
no longer applies to private sector employees, 12 the court pointed out
that a strike by United States government employees may be treated
as a crime. 13 Furthermore, only ten states 14 have explicitly allowed
3. Id.
4. Plaintiff is one of twenty-seven sanitation districts in Los Angeles County.
The plaintiff operates facilities which provide sanitation services to approximately four
million residents of Los Angeles County. The district employs approximately five
hundred employees, who are members of or are represented by defendant union. Id.
at 567, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
5. Defendant is a local labor organization which is affiliated with the Service Em-
ployees International Union, AFL-CIO. Since 1973, defendant has been the certified
bargaining representative of all the blue collar employees of the Los Angeles Sanita-
tion District. From the time of its certification to the present, defendant has bargained
with plaintiff regarding wages, hours, and working conditions. These negotiations
have consistently resulted in binding labor contracts or memoranda of understanding,
until 1976. Id
6. The strike lasted for eleven days. During the strike, plaintiff continued to op-
erate through the use of management personnel and union employees who chose not
to strike. I& at 568, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
7. Id
8. IcL
9. Id, The trial court awarded plaintiff $246,904 in compensatory (strike-related)
damages, prejudgment interest in the amount of $87,615.22, and costs of $874.65. Id.
10. Id at 569, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
11. Id
12. Modernly, the right to strike is viewed as being indispensable to collective bar-
gaining and negotiation in the private sector. Id, at 569, 699 P.2d at 838, 214 Cal. Rptr.
at 427.
13. Id
14. These states are as follows: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Mon-
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strikes by state and local employees. 15
The majority stated that the California courts have continually left
the issue of the legality of strikes by public employees unanswered. 16
The legislature has also remained silent on the issue.1 7 The present
case arose under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act [hereinafter
MMBA],' 8 which neither denies nor grants the right to strike to mu-
nicipal and county employees in California. 19 The court stated that
the MMBA "establishes a system of rights and protections for public
employees which closely mirrors those enjoyed by workers in the pri-
vate sector.
'20
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority began its analysis by stating that there have been
four prevailing justifications to the common law prohibition against
public employee strikes: first, that such strikes are equivalent to a de-
nial of governmental sovereignty;21 second, that the terms of public
employment contracts are not subject to bilateral collective bargain-
ing because they are set unilaterally by the legislature;22 third, that
tana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. at 569 n.8, 699 P.2d at 838
n.8, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 427 n.8.
15. These states have permitted this type of strike by statute. Id. at 569, 699 P.2d
at 838, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
16. The court stated that in the cases of In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273,
65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968), City of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403,
120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975), and International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1245 v.
City of Gridley, 34 Cal. 3d 191, 666 P.2d 960, 193 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1983), the courts left
this issue unanswered by either expressly reserving opinion on the issue or by stating
that they did not have the occasion to resolve the issue in the action. County Sanita-
tion, 38 Cal. 3d at 570, 699 P.2d at 838-39, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
17. Id. at 571, 699 P.2d at 839, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 428. The court stated that the only
statutory prohibition against strikes by public employees applies to firefighters under
California Labor Code section 1962.
18. The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, [hereinafter MMBA], is contained within sec-
tions 3500-11 of the California Government Code. The MMBA allows municipal and
county employees to join and participate in employee organizations and requires public
employers to meet and confer in good faith with employee representatives on all issues
which are within the scope of representation. Id. at 571, 699 P.2d at 839-40, 214 Cal.
Rptr. at 428-29.
19. Id. at 572, 699 P.2d at 840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429. See also Note, Collective Bar-
gaining Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act-Should Local Public Employees Have
the Right to Strike, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 523 (1984).
20. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 573, 699 P.2d at 841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430. As
a result of the legislature's silence on the legality of strikes by public employees, the
court stated that it was the judiciary's task to finally resolve this issue. I&
21. Id. at 574, 699 P.2d at 841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
22. Id.
public strikes would result in a distortion of the political process; 23
and fourth, that strikes by public employees threaten the public
welfare.24
The sovereignty justification, simply stated, means that "the gov-
ernment is "the embodiment of the people, and hence those en-
trusted to carry out its function may not impede it."'25 In recent
years, this argument has lost a great deal of support and its rejection
by the courts has been a justification for denying governmental im-
munity from tort liability.26 In rejecting the sovereignty argument as
a justification of a per se prohibition against public employee strikes,
the court pointed out that the application of the argument is inconsis-
tent with "modern social reality .... ",27
As to the second justification, the court stated that its premise is in
the belief that "public employers are virtually powerless to respond
to strike pressure. .. 28 because the terms of public employment are
determined by the legislature. The court pointed out that this view is
no longer valued modernly since a majority of the terms and condi-
tions of public employment contracts are arrived at through collec-
tive bargaining.29
The third argument draws upon the idea that since government
services are essential and the public's demand is inflexible, the ability
to strike would give public employees a great deal of bargaining
power.30 However, there is little empirical evidence, if any, which ef-
fectively demonstrates that governments, in an effort to resolve
strikes, generally surrender to unreasonable demands by public
employees.3 1
23. I&
24. Id.
25. Id. at 574, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431. The court stated that this ar-
gument received a great deal of support from several American presidents in the first
half of the twentieth century. Id at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431. See
generally Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 741 (1946) (a case
which relied on the sovereignty argument).
26. The court stated that the California Supreme Court quashed this sovereignty
argument in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961). County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 576, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
27. Id. As a result, the court stated that this argument should be permanently
"laid to rest." Id.
28. Id. at 576, 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
29. Id. The court stated that public employment collective bargaining occurs
under a variety of statutes, such as the MMBA. Id. See also El Rancho Unified School
Dist. v. National Educ. Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 946, 963, 663 P.2d 893, 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 123,
134 (1983) (Grodin, J., concurring).
30. 38 Cal. 3d at 577, 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
31. Id. at 579, 699 P.2d at 845, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434. The court, citing Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (air traffic controllers' strike), stated that governments in fact have the authority
to hold firm against a strike without capitulating to striking workers demands. County
Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 578, 699 P.2d at 844, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 433. The court further
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In analyzing the final argument used to support the common law
prohibition against strikes, the court stated that there is little corre-
lation between the essential nature of the government services and
the source and management of most service enterprises. 32 The type
of the service provided is determinative of its essential nature and of
the impact of its disruption on the public welfare.
33
To begin its analysis on the main issue, the court viewed the em-
ployees ability to strike as a means of equalizing bargaining positions.
It stated that where there is an absence of some means of equalizing
bargaining positions, both sides are less likely to engage in good faith
bargaining. This leads eventually to more and longer strikes.
3 4
The plantiff's argument that only the legislature can change the
common law doctrine prohibiting public employees from striking was
rejected. The court "has long recognized the need to redefine, mod-
ify or even abolish a common law rule 'when reason or equity de-
mand it' or when its underlying principles are no longer justifiable in
light of modern society."'35
The court concluded that it is not unlawful for public employees to
engage in a concerted work stoppage for the purpose of improving
their wages or conditions of employment.36 However, it limited the
listed four factors that serve to effectively reduce the potential bargaining power of
striking public employees: first, lost wages due to a strike are as important to a public
employee as they are to a private employee; second, economic considerations, such as
public concern over rising tax rates, will prevent domination of the decision-making
process by political considerations; third, in areas where there is a charge for services,
there are economic implications of bargaining, leading to higher prices which are visi-
ble to the public; and fourth, in areas where subcontracting to the private sector is a
viable alternative, an increase in price allows many government agencies to eliminate
public services. Id,
32. Id. at 579, 699 P.2d at 845, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
33. Id, at 580, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435. See also United Transp. Union
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), which adopts this conclusion.
34. 38 Cal. 3d at 583, 699 P.2d at 847, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
35. Id, at 584, 699 P.2d at 848, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 525 P.2d 669, 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772 (1974)).
The court enumerated two examples of past rulings modifying common law rules. In
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the court
adopted the rule of comparative negligence, thereby rejecting the rule of contributory
negligence. In Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), the court recognized a spousal action for loss of consortium with-
out any sort of legislative action. 38 Cal. 3d at 584, 699 P.2d at 848-49, 214 Cal. Rptr. at
437-38.
36. While the court held that the common law prohibition against strikes by pub-
lic employees should no longer be recognized in California, it stated that it was neces-
sary to reach the issue of the ability of public employees to strike in constitutional
terms. However, the court did state that the argument that the personal freedoms
right of public employees to strike37 to those situations where the
work stoppage does not pose an imminent threat to public health or
safety.38
IV. SEPARATE OPINIONS
Separate concurring opinions were filed by Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Kaus and Grodin. Justice Kaus limited his concurrence to
the portion of the judgment holding that a peaceful strike does not
give rise to a tort action for damages against the union. He stated
that the judiciary should not usurp the legislature's authority to de-
cide whether a tort action is the appropriate method of dealing with
strikes by public employees.3 9
Chief Justice Bird stated that the purpose of her opinion was to
give the legislature guidance in this area.40 The basis of her guidance
was that "[t]he constitutional right to strike rests on a number of
bedrock principles", 41 and that withdrawing the right to strike de-
prives the worker of his only effective bargaining power.
42
Responding to Justice Kaus' concern about creating damage actions
against unions, Justice Grodin stated that no distinction existed "be-
tween the availability of an injunction at common law and the availa-
bility of a damage action . . . . "4 A proceeding in contempt, for
which monetary sanctions may be imposed, can arise where an in-
junction is violated.44
In the only dissenting opinion filed, Justice Lucas stated that pub-
lic employees never had and should not be granted the right to
strike.45 Public strikes may "devastate a city within a matter of days,
or even hours .... ,,46 Justice Lucas felt that this issue was best left
to the wisdom of the legislature, and until the legislature acted, past
precedent should not be overturned. 47
guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions confer an absolute right
to strike would possibly merit consideration in the future. Id at 590-91, 699 P.2d at
853-54, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 441-43.
37. The court stated that "[p]rudence and concern for the general public welfare
require certain restrictions," such as a complete prohibition on firefighters' rights to
strike. Id. at 585, 699 P.2d at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
38. Id at 592, 699 P.2d at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
39. Id (Kaus, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 593, 699 P.2d at 855, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (Bird, C.J. concurring).
41. Chief Justice Bird stated three main principles: "(1) the basic personal liberty
to pursue happiness and economic security through productive labor... ; (2) the abso-
lute prohibition against involuntary servitude. . . ; and (3) the fundamental freedoms
of association and expression." Id. at 594, 699 P.2d at 855-56, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
42. Id. at 599, 699 P.2d at 859, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
43. Id. at 609, 699 P.2d at 859, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
44. Id
45. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 610, 699 P.2d at 867, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
47. Id. at 609-13, 699 P.2d at 866-69, 214 Cal Rptr. at 455-58.
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V. CONCLUSION
The full impact of the court's landmark decision is unclear in the
absence of potential legislative statements. If the court's opinion re-
ceives support from the legislature, it will, in the short run, result in
a series of strikes by public employees. However, in the long run this
decision will result in more effective negotiations between unions
and governmental agencies and increased harmony in the public
workplace.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
XII. PRIVACY
The monitoring of telephone conversations on an
extension held to be a violation of the Invasion of
Privacy Act: Ribas v. Clark.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of Ribas v. Clark,1 the California Supreme Court an-
nounced a significant interpretation of the Invasion of Privacy Act.
2
The primary issue facing the court was whether the Invasion of Pri-
vacy Act should be interpreted to prohibit monitoring of conversa-
tions by means of an extension telephone. The court held that the
use of an extension telephone to monitor another's confidential com-
munications was actionable under Penal Code section 631(a) 3 and
that it did not fall within the statutory exception of Penal Code sec-
1. 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985). Opinion by Justice
Mosk, with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and Grodin concurring. A sepa-
rate concurring and dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Kaus, with Justices
Broussard and Lucas concurring therein.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.2 (West Supp. 1985). See also Decker & Handler,
Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions & Remedies, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 60
(1975); Karbian, Case Against Wiretapping, 1 Pac. L.J. 133 (1970). For federal law on
wiretapping, see the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
2510 (1983).
3. California Penal Code section 631(a) in pertinent part states:
Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in
any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection,
whether physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with
any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire,
line cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system,
... is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500), or by imprisonment in the County jail not exceeding one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.. . , or by both such fine and imprisonment
in the county jail or in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West Supp. 1985).
tion 631(b). 4 The court's opinion focused on an analysis of Penal
Code section 631 and the legislative intent behind it.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The case arose when the plaintiff's wife consulted an attorney re-
garding the tax ramifications of a court approved settlement in a di-
vorce proceeding.5 The consultation revealed allegedly adverse tax
consequences, prompting the plaintiff's wife to inform the plaintiff
that she had retained counsel.6 Immediately thereafter, the plaintiff
had a heated telephone conversation with his wife's attorney.7
Approximately one hour later, the plaintiff's wife went to the de-
fendant's place of business, requesting to use the telephone to call
her husband. She asked the defendant to listen to the conversation
on an extension telephone.8 Based on the conversation, the plain-
tiff's wife filed an action to set aside the divorce settlement, alleging
that it had been procured by the plaintiff's fraudulent conduct.9
Testifying at an arbitration hearing, the defendant stated that she
had heard10 the plaintiff say that he had not allowed his wife to re-
tain counsel in the divorce proceeding.1 ' As a result, the plaintiff
filed the present action even though the arbitrator in his wife's suit
had ruled in his favor.12 The trial court sustained a demurrer to the
amended complaint without leave to amend, and the plaintiff ap-
4. California Penal Code section 631(b) in pertinent part states:
This section shall not apply (1) to any public utility engaged in the business
of providing communications services and facilities, or to the officers, employ-
ees or agents thereof, where the acts otherwise prohibited herein are for the
purpose of construction, maintenance, conduct or operation of the services and
facilities of such public utility, or (2) to the use of any instrument, equipment,
facility, or service furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of such a public.
utility, or (3) to any telephonic communication system used for communica-
tion exclusively within a state, county, city and county, or city correctional
facility.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(b) (West Supp. 1985).
5. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 358, 696 P.2d at 639, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The plaintiff's
wife had not been represented by counsel throughout the divorce proceedings. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. During this telephone conversation, the defendant heard the plaintiff, due to
his wife's prompting, discuss the details of his conversation with his wife's attorney.
I&
9. Id.
10. The defendant had admitted that she was able to hear the conversation as a
result of eavesdropping via the use of the extension telephone. Id.
11. Id.
12. The defendant's testimony caused the plaintiff to file the case at bar seeking
damages under California Penal Code sections 631(a) and 637, and for invasion of pri-
vacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrage. Id. The California
Supreme Court reviewed the act of eavesdropping only in light of section 631. 38 Cal.
3d at 359-65, 696 P.2d at 639-44, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 145-50. See supra notes 4-5 and accom-
panying text.
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pealed to the supreme court.13
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The plaintiff's primary contention was that the defendant's moni-
toring of the conversation between the plaintiff and his wife consti-
tuted a breach of the Invasion of Privacy Act. In accepting this
contention, 14 the court focused on the legislative intent of section 631
which is "to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state"
from what is perceived as "a serious threat to the free exercise of
personal liberties [that] cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized so-
ciety."1 5 The court pointed out that section 631 of the Penal Code
16
was aimed at preventing eavesdropping or secret monitoring of con-
versations by third parties.
17
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the Invasion of
Privacy Act prohibited only the unauthorized monitoring of conver-
sations before the phone message reaches its place of destination.
The court stated that the plain language of section 631 applies to all
communications while "in transit" or while the communication "is
being sent from, or received at any place within this state. .... 18
The defendant's next argument claimed that section 631 of the Cal-
ifornia Penal Code only prohibited wiretaps.19 The court quickly dis-
13. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 358, 696 P.2d at 639, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
14. Rejecting the defendant's counterargument that the Invasion of Privacy Act
has never been construed to prohibit eavesdropping by means of an extension tele-
phone, the court relied upon a strict statutory interpretation of Penal Code section
631(a). Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 359, 696 P.2d at 639-40, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
15. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (1982)). The court further stated that this
policy was at the heart of almost all of the California court decisions which have con-
strued the Invasion of Privacy Act. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 359, 696 P.2d at 639-40, 212 Cal.
Rptr. at 145-46 (citing Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal. App. 3d 805, 810, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474
(1979)).
16. See supra notes 4-5.
17. 38 Cal. 3d at 359, 696 P.2d at 640, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (citing Roger v. Ulrich,
52 Cal. App. 3d 894, 899, 125 Cal. Rptr. 306, 309 (1975)).
18. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 360, 696 P.2d at 640, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (emphasis in orig-
inal). The court stated that as a result of the plain language of section 631 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, the plaintiff's telephone conversation with his wife fell squarely
within the parameters of the statute, thereby establishing a prima facie violation of
section 631. Id.
19. The defendant based her argument on People v. Soles, 68 Cal. App. 3d 418, 420,
136 Cal. Rptr. 328, 330 (1977), in which the court held that section 631 of the California
Penal Code was inapplicable where a motel manager had listened to the defendant's
telephone conversations concerning narcotics transactions through the use of a motel
switchboard. The court held that tenants of the motel were precluded from having a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations due to the motel manager's
continuing interest in preventing criminal activity from occurring on his premises. Id
missed this argument by viewing past California cases construing the
Invasion of Privacy Act, as well as reviewing how other state courts
have construed the eavesdropping statutes in their jurisdictions. It
concluded that the objective of the Invasion of Privacy Act was to
prevent the type of conduct which occurred in the present case.20
Once the court had determined that the defendant's eavesdropping
fell within the purview of section 631(a), the court had to determine
whether the defendant's act fell within any of the exceptions enu-
merated within section 631(b). 21 The defendant contended that her
conduct fell within one of the exceptions because the telephone ex-
tension, which she had used to eavesdrop, had been provided, in-
stalled, and serviced by the telephone company. 22 Finding that the
defendant's contention was without merit, the court stated that the
defendant had not met her burden of proof; she had not established
that her conduct was in compliance with any relevant tariffs men-
tioned in section 631(b).2 3 Further, even if the defendant had met
her burden of proof, the court stated that the defendant's conduct
would not fall within the purview of the exception as her interpreta-
tion of section 631 was contrary to the express legislative objective.24
The defendant's final argument related to the privilege which is ac-
corded to statements that are first published in judicial proceedings. 25
The court accepted this argument. The privilege was a complete bar
to the portion of the plaintiff's action that was based on outrage and
on a common law right to privacy.26
In discussing the remaining cause of action for eavesdropping, the
court held that the privilege accorded to statements which are pub-
lished in judicial proceedings would not bar the plaintiff's recovery
under California Penal Code section 637.2.27 Plaintiff was therefore
20. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 361, 696 P.2d at 641, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 147. See People v.
Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975)
(reasonable expectation of privacy requirement).
21. See supra note 5 for the text of section 631(b).
22. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 362, 696 P.2d at 641-42, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48.
23. Id. The court stated that the defendant had not demonstrated that her exten-
sion telephone had in fact been furnished by the telephone company nor had she sub-
mitted copies of the tariffs. Id.
24. The court stated that section 631 was designed to "'protect a person placing or
receiving a call from a situation where the person on the other end of the line permits
an outsider to tap his telephone or listen in on the call.' " 38 Cal. 3d at 363, 696 P.2d at
652, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (quoting Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California: A
Study in State Legislative Control, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1182, 1202 (1969)) (emphasis in
original).
25. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 363-64, 696 P.2d at 642, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The defend-
ant's argument was primarily based upon California Civil Code section 47, which deals
with publication of defamatory matter and states in pertinent part: "A privileged pub-
lication or broadcast is one made - . In any ... judicial proceeding or . . . other
official proceeding authorized by law. " CAL. CIV. CODE §47 (West 1982).
26. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 364, 696 P.2d at 643, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
27. Section 637.2 of the Penal Code states in pertinent part:
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allowed to pursue the statutory remedy of a civil lawsuit.
28
IV. SEPARATE OPINION
In the only separate opinion filed, Justice Kaus both concurred and
dissented.29 While he agreed with the majority's holding that the
complaint alleged a violation of section 631 of the Penal Code, but he
took exception to the majority's interpretation of the application of
the tariff exception.
30
V. CONCLUSION
In Ribas v. Clark, the court determined that the use of an exten-
sion telephone to monitor another's confidential communications
would constitute a violation of the Invasion of Privacy Act. Thus, the
defendant's act of eavesdropping on a telephone conversation be-
tween the plaintiff and his wife through the use of an extension tele-
phone violated section 631(a) of the Penal Code. The court further
stated that this type of activity would not fall within the purview of
the exception of section 631(b) of the Penal Code.
The impact of this decision appears to be very limited as the court
seemed to limit its holding to situations involving the monitoring of
telephone conversations through the use of extension telephones.
Throughout the whole opinion, the court expressed strong policy con-
siderations behind their holding and behind the enactment of the In-
vasion of Privacy Act. The policy primarily is to protect the right of
privacy of the people of California from any invasion in regard to
their telephone communications.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
(a) Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring
an action against the person who committed the violation for the greater of
the following amounts:
(1) Three thousand dollars ($3,000).
(2) Three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff.
(b) Any person may, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3 (com-
mencing with Section 525) of Title 7 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter, and may in
the same action seek damages as provided by subdivision (a).
(c) It is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that
the plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West 1970).
28. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 365, 696 P.2d at 644, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
29. Id. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
30. Id.
XIII. TORTS
A. Landlord is strictly liable for injuries that result from a
preexisting latent defect in demised premises: Becker v.
IRM Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Becker v. IRM Corp.,' the California Supreme Court held that a
landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable
in tort for a tenant's injuries resulting from a latent defect in a
rented apartment complex. The defect existed at the time the apart-
ment was initially rented.2 The plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's
apartment complex,3 slipped and fell against a glass shower door in
his apartment, severely lacerating his arm when the door shattered. 4
The shower door was made of frosted untempered glass.5 Prior to
purchasing the complex, the defandant examined most of the apart-
ments. He observed that all the shower doors were made of the same
frosted glass.6
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and dismissed the plaintiff's strict liability and negligence
causes of action.7 The supreme court reversed. It held that there
was a triable issue of fact as to whether a visual inspection of the
shower door would have disclosed the danger.8 Thus, the trial court's
order granting summary judgment for the defendant was erroneous.
II. DISCUSSION
The majority began its analysis of the case by reviewing prior case
law concerning strict liabilty in tort and the development of landlord
liability for tenant injuries.9 The court began its review with the
landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,10 in which the
1. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), Justice Broussard for the
majority. Justices Kaus, Reynoso, and Grodin concurred. Chief Justice Bird con-
curred separately. Justice Lucas concurred and dissented. Justice Mosk concurred
with Justice Lucas. For a more plenary discussion of Becker see Note, The Landlord as
a Retailer? Strict Products Liability and the Landlord-Tenant Relationship in Califor-
nia: Becker v. JRMR Corp. 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 524 (1985).
2. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
3. The apartment complex was built in 1962-63. The defendant had purchased it
in 1974. Id. at 457-58, 698 P.2d at 117-18, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
4. Id.
5. Id. The court stated it was undisputed that had the door been made of tem-
pered glass, the risk of serious injury would have been substantially reduced. Id.
6. Id. The only visible difference between tempered and untempered glass is that
tempered glass contains a very small mark in the corner of each piece of glass. Id.
7. Id
8. Id. at 469, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
9. Id. at 458-64, 698 P.2d at 118-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215-19.
10. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff
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court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an ar-
ticle he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being."'" In Greenman, the court expressed that the intent
and purpose behind strict liability in tort is "to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market rather than by the in-
jured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. '12
The court traced the development of strict liability in tort since
Greenman. Strict tort liability has been applied to both manufactur-
ers of products as well as to various members in the commercial mar-
keting chain. 13 It has also been applied to individuals involved in the
real estate business, and in that application has been called the war-
ranty doctrine. 14 Moreover, the California courts have recognized
that construction contracts contain a warranty of merchantability
and suitability for ordinary use.' 5 The main policy consideration for
this type of warranty is that the builder usually possesses greater
knowledge than the purchaser and can fully examine and inspect a
completed building without disturbing the finished product.16 Thus,
the court pointed out that "public interest dictates that the cost of in-
jury from defects should be borne by the developer who created the
danger and who is in a better economic position to bear the loss
"'7
After reviewing the recent trends in strict tort liability, the court
focused on current developments in landlord liability.'8 It recog-
nized that in the absence of a contrary agreement between parties
there has been a strong trend toward increasing the landlord's re-
was injured while using a combination power tool manufactured and sold by the de-
fendants. Id.
11. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
12. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
13. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216. The court ex-
plained that strict liability in tort has been applied to a wholesale-retail distributor,
personal property lessors and bailors, and a licensor of personalty. Id.
14. Id. at 460, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
15. I& See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969).
16. 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216. See generally Pollard v.
Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 379, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651
(1974).
17. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The Green-
man view of strict liability in tort appears to have permeated the area of real estate,
including landlord liability for tenant injuries.
18. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 461, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
sponsibility to provide premises suitable for the tenants' intended
use.
19
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the California courts have
recognized an implied warranty of habitability contained within a
lease for a dwelling.20 In viewing all of the policy considerations be-
hind the prevailing view in California, the majority relied heavily
upon Green v. Superior Court,21 in which the court likened the leas-
ing of a dwelling to the act of purchasing a good or service.2 2 The
court in Green held that a breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility may be set forth as a defense in an unlawful detainer
proceeding.23
The court indicated that the extension of strict liability for injuries
suffered by tenants resulting from the defective condition of prem-
ises was due to the court's previous holdings that leases contain an
implied warranty of habitability.24 The court discussed the tradi-
tional common law rule of landlord nonliability and its derivation
from the concept of caveat emptor, traditional property law and the
landlord's lack of possession and control.25 It noted that a number of
exceptions have developed to this nonliability rule.26
The case presented three main issues which were addressed by the
court. First, whether a landlord engaged in the business of leasing
dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent
defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the prem-
ises were leased to the tenant.27 Second, whether the absence of a
19. Id. The court recognized that "no one should be allowed or forced to live in
unsafe and unhealthy housing." Id, (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
ch. 5, introductory note (1976)). Concerning landlord-tenant relationships, the court
reviewed California Civil Code sections 1941 (fitness of buildings for human occu-
pancy); 1941.2 (tenant's affirmative obligations), 1942 (repairs by tenant, tenant's reme-
dies to recover expenses); and 1942 (validity of waiver of tenants rights). Id at 462, 698
P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr.at 217.
20. Id
21. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974).
22. In Green, the plaintiff/landlord sued to compel the defendant to pay $300 in
back rent and for possession of the leased premises. Defendant contended that the
plaintiff had failed to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. Id
23. Id. at 631, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
24. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 463, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218. The court
stated that under the common law rule a landlord was not liable to the tenant for inju-
ries resulting from a defective condition or faulty construction of premises in the ab-
sence of fraud, concealment or a covenant in the lease. Id.
25. Id.
26. The court enumerated five exceptions to the common law rule of landlord
nonliability: 1) where the landlord voluntarily undertakes to repair; 2) where the
landlord had knowledge of the defects; 3) where a safety law was violated; 4) where
the landlord retained part of the premises for common use; and 5) where the leased
premises were semipublic. Id. (quoting 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
§ 453, (8th ed. 1973)).
27. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 698 P.2d at 121-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
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continuing business relationship between the builder and the land-
lord precludes application of strict liability in tort for latent defects
existing at the time of the lease.28 Third, whether a duty to inspect
for a dangerous condition existed in the case at bar. Finally, as a
subissue, the court considered whether the landlord's lack of aware-
ness of the dangerous condition precludes liability.29
The court's analysis of the first issue focused on Greenman as a
starting point for the development of strict tort liability for defective
premises. 30 The court pointed out that prior to Greenman most cases
limited liability to conditions which existed at the time when the ten-
ant took possession of the premises. 31 Cases decided subsequent to
Greenman, specifically, Fakhoury v. Magner32 and Golden v. Con-
way,33 developed the rule that a landlord, when engaged in the busi-
ness of leasing property, is strictly liable in tort when he equips the
premises with a defective appliance which causes injury.34
The court concluded that a landlord :is strictly liable in tort for in-
juries which result from latent defects in the premises existing at the
time the premises are leased to the tenant.35 The court indicated
that its holding on this issue was the result of its satisfaction with the
rationale previously developed in the Fakhoury3 6 and the Golden37
cases. It stated that the main reason for the application of strict lia-
bility to landlords for latent defects existing at the time of rental was
to insure that landlords bear the cost of injuries resulting from such
defects. 38
28. Id. at 464-67, 698 P.2d at 122-24, 213 Cal.: Rptr. at 219-21.
29. Id. at 467-69, 698 P.2d at 124-26, 213 Cal.! Rptr. at 219-23.
30. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 2 7 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
31. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 698 P.2d at 121-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
32. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
33. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
34. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. See Golden v.
Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal.
App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
35. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at i22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court
stated in a footnote that its holding did not resolve whether strict liability in tort
would apply to a disclosed defect. Id- at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
219 n.4. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
36. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
37. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
38. To further support its holding the court 'discussed five policy considerations for
imposing strict liability. First, the landlord, absent disclosure of defects to the tenant,
makes an implied representation that the premises are fit for their intended use. Fur-
ther, this representation is usually indispensible to the lease. See Pollard v. Saxe &
Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 :Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
Second, a tenant is in no position to inspect f~r latent defects nor is he in the finan-
The court then addressed the defendant's argument that a landlord
when purchasing an existing building should be exempt from strict
liability for latent defects. The defendant argued that a landlord is
not a part of the marketing and manufacturing enterprise 39 and
therefore had neither a continuing business relationship with the
builder nor control of construction of the premises. The court recog-
nized exceptions to the application of strict liabilty in tort exempting
sellers of used machinery. However, it rejected the defendant's argu-
ment stating that "[t]he paramount policy of the strict products liabil-
ity rule remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of
compensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing de-
fects."'40 The court held that the absence of a continuing business re-
lationship between the builder and the landlord does not preclude
the application of strict liability in tort for latent defects existing
prior to the lease.41
The majority began its analysis of the third issue by reviewing the
realities confronting an individual purchasing rental property. An in-
dividual exercising due care will normally examine the condition of
the rental property before purchasing.42 Examination is usually two-
fold: first, to determine if the premises are aesthetically pleasing;
and second, to determine if the premises meet bare living
standards.43
The court held that the landlord had a duty to exercise due care by
inspecting for dangerous conditions. The defendant's lack of aware-
ness of the dangerous condition did not necessarily preclude liability.
The landlord's duty to inspect extends only to knowledge of those
items which would have been disclosed as a result of a reasonable
inspection.44
cial position to repair them when contracting to purchase housing for a limited period
of time. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974).
Third, the tenant's ability to inspect the premises is usually substantially less than
that of the purchaser of the property. Fourth, the tenant is usually forced to rely upon
the implied assurance of safety made by the landlord. Finally, the landlord is in a bet-
ter position, due to rentals and insurance, to bear the cost of injuries due to defects in
the premises. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 698 P.2d at 122-23, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219-220.
39. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 219, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court
stated that defendant's reliance on Vandemark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391
P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), was misplaced since the primary rationale for strict
liability is cost spreading capability. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 220.
40. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
41. Id. at 467, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
42. Id. at 468, 698 P.2d at 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
43. The court stated the determination of the premises' safety is included in find-
ing "bare living standards."
44. Id. at 469, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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III. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Bird restricted her concurring opinion to two areas:4 5
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the
defendant, and whether strict liability should be applied to land-
lords.46 Concerning the order of summary judgment for the defend-
ant, Chief Justice Bird stated that the defendant did not meet his
burden of proof as the foreseeability of risk involved with this type of
shower door presented a triable issue of fact.4 7 Chief Justice Bird
limited her analysis of the issue of strict liability to an overview of
the past application of strict liability to landlords.48 She reviewed the
general rules governing the area of strict liability, but she did not ap-
ply these rules to the case at bar.49
Justice Lucas concurred and dissented, agreeing that a landlord
should be held liable for dangerous conditions of which he had actual
or constructive knowledge. However, the Justice did not agree with
the application of this rule for latent defects in any component of a
landlord's property regardless of who built or installed the defective
item.50
Justice Lucas advocated limiting the application of strict liability in
tort to those individuals who manufacture, install, or alter a defective
product and who have actual or constructive knowledge of the de-
fect.5 1 As to subsequent-purchaser landlords who have not created
the defective condition or item and who do not have actual or con-
structive knowledge, Justice Lucas stated that the imposition of strict
liability places too great a burden on the landlord; he has no way of
adjusting potential costs of the manufacturer's business.5 2 Justice
Lucas concluded by stating that the majority's opinion operates as a
form of insurance for tenants, yet does nothing to promote the goals
of deterrence and product safety.5 3
45. Chief Justice Bird adopted Justice Newsom's opinion of the California Court
of Appeal. I& at 470, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
46. I& at 470-79, 698 P.2d at 126-33, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223-30.
47. I& at 470-74, 698 P.2d at 126-29, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223-26.
48. 1d& at 475-79, 698 P.2d at 130-33, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 227-30.
49. 1I
50. I at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
51. 1I at 479-87, 698 P.2d at 133-39, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230-36.
52. Id, at 487, 698 P.2d at 139, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
53. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's opinion will have a broad effect. The decision will ben-
efit tenants, especially those in lower income brackets who are un-
able to repair or insure against defects. The decision also places a
burden on landlords to keep their premises free from defective prod-
ucts. The imposition of strict liability may also have some effect on
the rental market. This effect, however, will probably be minimized
by the landlord's ability to receive indemnification from the manufac-
turer of the defective product. In summary, this decision broadens
the application of California products liability law to defective
premises.
JESSICA L. LEMOINE
B. A tortfeasor who settles in good faith is insulated from
indemnity claims of co-defendants: Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Associates
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tech-Bilt, Inc., v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,1 the court con-
sidered whether a tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff should be in-
sulated from claims of indemnity made by nonsettling co-defendants.
The majority held that the settling defendant would be protected
only where the settlement is made in "good faith" under sections
8772 and 877.63 of the Code of Civil Procedure.4 The court then had
1. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal Rptr. 256 (1985). The majority opinion was
written by Justice Grodin, with Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Lucas
concurring. A separate dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Bird.
2. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980) provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to
sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judg-
ment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the
same tort
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
3. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the
court on the basis of affadavits served with the notice of hearing, and any
counterafadavits filed in response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion,
receive other evidence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good
faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the
settling tortfesor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or compar-
ative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of
proof on that issue.
4. 38 Cal. 3d at 493, 698 P.2d at 162, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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to decide what constituted good faith.
The action arose in the Superior Court of San Diego County when
the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew, brought suit to recover damages
for structural defects against the developer of their residence (Tech-
Bilt) and the soil engineers who had performed services on their resi-
dential property (Woodward-Clyde). Plaintiffs' action against Wood-
ward-Clyde was, however, barred by the ten year statue of
limitations. An agreement was reached between Woodward-Clyde
and the plaintiffs whereby the plaintiffs dismissed their claim against
Woodward-Clyde with prejudice in return for assurances that no ac-
tion for costs incurred in defending the action would be brought
against the plaintiffs.5
Tech-Bilt later filed an amended cross-complaint and named Wood-
ward-Clyde as a cross-defendant. Woodward-Clyde successfully
moved the court for summary judgment based upon a claim of good
faith settlement under section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.6
Tech-Bilt appealed this ruling to the supreme court.
II. CASE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a release,
dismissal, or covenant not to sue or enforce a judgment given to one
party in an action involving multiple tortfeasors discharges that party
from liability to any other defendant for contribution. The state fur-
ther provides that such release must be made in good faith.7
Section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows a joint
tortfeasor who is not released from liability to challenge the good
faith of any settlement. The party challenging the good faith of the
settlement has the burden of proof on that issue.8 The key to decid-
ing cases involving the statute lies in ascertaining a meaning to the
term "good faith."9
Justice Grodin, writing for the majority, first reviewed the legisla-
tive and case history prior to the enactment of section 877.6.10 In
5. Id. at 492, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
6. Id.
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980):
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1985)
9. 38 Cal. 3d at 491, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal Rptr. at 258. This is because only
good faith settlements will relieve the tortfeasors from liability for contribution as to
the other nonsettling tortfeasors. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
10. 38 Cal. 3d at 493, 698 P.2d at 162, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The court first ex-
looking at tort contribution legislation, 11 which spawned sections 877
and 877.6,12 the court noted two major goals. The initial goal was the
equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault. The second goal
was the encouragement of settlement. 13 Ascertaining what consti-
tutes good faith requires a balancing of these two objectives. Section
877 originally only released a settling tortfeasor from liability for
contribution and not partial indemnity; this changed when the court
articulated a remedial theory of partial indemnity in American Mo-
torcycle Association v. Superior Court. 14 This theory provided that a
settling tortfeasor who enters into a good faith settlement must also
be discharged from any claim of partial indemnity.1 5 The legislature
codified the holding of American Motorcycle by enacting section 877.6
in 1980.16
The Tech-Bilt court felt this background suggested that "good
faith" as used in section 877.6 would have the same meaning ascribed
to the same term in American Mototcycle.17 A similar conclusion
was reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Commercial
Union Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,' 8 which held that a settle-
ment must be made in good faith before another party can be pre-
vented from seeking indemnification from the settling party. That
court did not find good faith where the plaintiff's attorney dismissed
Ford as a tactical maneuver. 19
The Tech-Bilt court also considered a competing interpretation of
the good faith requirement as espoused in Dompeling v. Superior
Court.20 That court held the "settling parties owe the nonsettling de-
fendants a legal duty to refrain from tortious or other wrongful con-
duct."'21 The Tech-Bilt court rejected this interpretation as producing
amined the common law, which held that there was no right to contribution among
tortfeasors. The theory behind this rule was that there was one wrong and that each
joint tortfeasor was responsible for the whole damage. Thus, payment by any of the
tortfeasors would satisfy plaintiff's claim against all others. Id.
11. The California State Bar sponsored the legislation, which was originally intro-
duced in 1955. The bill's purpose was to change the rule denying contribution among
joint tortfeasors. The original bill did not address the effect of a covenant or release
given to a joint tortfeasor. At the suggestion of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, section 877 was added to the Code of Civil Procedure. Id at 493-94, 698 P.2d at
162-63, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
12. Section 877.6 was enacted by the legislature in 1980. Id. at 494-96, 698 P.2d at
163-64, 213 Cal Rptr. at 260-61.
13. Id at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (citing River Garden Farms Inc.
v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
14. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198 (1978).
15. Id.
16. 38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
17. Id. at 496, 698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
18. 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 213.
20. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981).
21. Id at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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too harsh a result.22 The court additionally noted that the legislature
did not intend the term to have the narrow meaning ascribed to it in
Dompeling in light of the court's decision in American Motorcycle.
Such an interpretation would allow ithe trial court to look at a
number of factors in determining whether the settlement was made
in good faith;23 an especially important factor is "whether the
amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the set-
tling tortfeasor's proportional share of the comparative liability for
the plaintiff's injuries. '24
The court noted that the burden of proving the absence of good
faith is on the party asserting it.25 That a party should be allowed to
show that the settlement was "so far out of the ballpark in relation
to these [previously mentioned] factors as to be inconsistent with the
equitable objectives of the statute. '26
In assessing the impact of its decision, the court did not believe the
new rule would be detrimental to the 'settlement process, nor that it
would unduly burden the parties or the trial court.27 The settlement
incentive would be at least as great, and possibly even greater, be-
cause the defendant would be induced! to offer more money to bring
the settlement within the good faith requirements. The trial court
would still have the discretion to decide whether the good faith re-
quirement had been met, and the defendants would still have the in-
centive to get out of the litigation for a reduced amount.28
Furthermore, there would be no undue burden on the trial courts
because the determination of good faith may be made on the basis of
affidavits.29 The court noted that negotiations should show whether
the settlements are within the reasohable range permitted by the
good faith requirement. The court may also use its personal experi-
22. 38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 165, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
23. These include the following: a rough approximation of the plaintiff's total re-
covery and the settlor's proportionate liability; allocation of settlement proceeds
among plaintiffs; the amount paid in settlement; recognition that a settlor should pay
less in settlement than he would if found liable after trial; financial conditions and in-
surance policy limits of settling defendants; and the existence of collusion, fraud, or
other tortuous conduct aimed at injuring the interests of nonsettling defendants. Id. at
499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.;
24. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
25. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1985).
26. 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 167, 21.3 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement" An Accommodation of
Competing Goals, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV., 841, 9282929 (1984).
29. Subdivision (b) of section 877.6 specifically provides for this. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 877.6(b) (West Supp. 1985).
ence in making such a determination. 30 The Tech-Bilt court noted
that several recent court of appeal opinions had engaged in this type
of analysis. Applying the good faith criterion mentioned above to the
settlement in the case at hand, the Tech-Bilt court found that the set-
tlement was not made in good faith because the plaintiffs did not re-
ceive adequate consideration for releasing Woodward-Clyde.3 l The
judgment was therefore reversed.32
B. Chief Justice Bird's Dissent
The Chief Justice believed the majority's test of good faith, which
originated in River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court,33 was not
the proper standard to apply. The Chief Justice pointed out that the
discussion in River Garden concerning the danger of a low settle-
ment was merely dicta.34 The court in River Garden also derived its
"fair share" good faith test from analogy to contract law.35 She ar-
gued that the flaw with an analogy to contract law is that the rela-
tionship between nonsettling and settling parties is not contractual.
Therefore, they do not have a duty to protect each other's interests.
The settling parties only have a duty to settle in good faith with an
"'honest, lawful intent.' "36
The Chief Justice felt that the rule would discourage settlements,
since there is the possibility of an expensive and lengthy hearing on
the good faith issue.37 Settlement is dependent on assurances to the
settling defendant of its finality.38 She argued the majority's stan-
dard would not promote finality, since it would be difficult for the
defendant to predict whether his settlement will be found to be in
good faith by the trial court. Furthermore, there is the possibility
that a favorable good faith determination could be reversed on
appeal.39
30. 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The problem with a
judge using his own expertise is that good faith to one judge might not be the same to
another. Defendants would be well-advised to do extensive research on what type of
settlements have satisfied their particular judge in the past before coming forward
with a settlement offer.
31. The court noted that Woodward-Clyde had not given the plaintiffs anything in
return for the dismissal, with the exception of the waiver of costs amounting to only
$55. 38 Cal. 3d at 492 n.2, 502, 698 P.2d. at 161 n.2, 168, 213 Cal Rptr. at 258 n.2, 265.
32. Id. at 501-02, 698 P.2d at 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
33. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
34. 38 Cal. 3d at 503, 698 P.2d at 169, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
35. See River Garden, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
36. 38 Cal. 3d at 505, 698 P.2d at 170, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (quoting People v. Nunn,
46 Cal. 2d 460, 468, 296 P.2d 813, 818 (1956)).
37. 38 Cal. 3d at 506, 698 P.2d at 171, 213 Cal. Rptr. 268.
38. Id. at 506-07, 698 P.2d at 172, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (discussing River Garden, 26
Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503). See Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18
STAN. L. REV. 486, 488-89 (1966).
39. 38 Cal. 3d at 507, 698 P.2d at 172, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
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Chief Justice Bird went on to argue that the trial court will be bur-
dened under the majority rule because they will have to make a pre-
trial determination of the plaintiff's potential recovery, as well as de-
termine the comparative fault of any party wishing to settle in rela-
tion to all the parties.40  The Chief Justice would only find a
settlement to be in bad-faith if it is "collusive, fraudulent, dishonest,
or involves tortious conduct. '4 1
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to determine the impact this case will have at this
point. While more settlements will be subjected to appellate review,
and hence be less certain as to finality, it seems unlikely many would
be reversed. This is because trial courts have the discretion to deter-
mine whether the settlement was made in good faith.
Actions involving many defendants and large claims of damages
(such as asbestos and DES cases) will be likely to encounter chal-
lenges concerning a lack of good faith in settlements. In these types
of cases, potential liability is so large that the joinder of one or two
previously settling defendants could decrease the other tortfeasors'
monetary responsibilities substantially.
KEITH F. MILLHOUSE
40. Id. at 506, 698 P.2d at 171, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 268. Indeed, the court almost has to
conduct its own trial to determine if settlement was within the "reasonable range."
This will be especially true if later decisions require trial courts to spell out those fac-
tors upon which they based their decisions.
41. Id. at 502-03, 698 P.2d at 169, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 266.

